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THE SUPREMES FIND A THEME
The Court Steers to the Center And Stresses Equal Rights
The Washington Post, OUTLOOK
Sunday, July 7, 1996
Garrett Epps
What in the world is happening at the Supreme
Court? The justices split three ways in deciding
whether the government could restrict "indecent"
programming on cable TV, and then refused to
review Hopwoodv. Texas, a closely watched case in
which a lower court threw into doubt the whole area
of affirmative action in higher education admissions.
But confusion at the Rehnquist court is old
news; we've been reading about it for nearly a
decade. More interesting were two key decisions
that may signal the emergence of a stable center on
the court -- a center whose influence may last long
after the sun has set on the Rehnquist era. The
important cases are United States v. Virginia, in
which the court ordered the state-sponsored Virginia
Military Institute to admit women, and Romer v.
Evans, in which the court told Colorado and its
voters that they could not amend the state's
constitution to exclude gays and lesbians from
civil-rights laws.
Both cases were decided by the same six-vote
majority: Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy,
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. The two opinions
suggest that these six have begun to unite around a
theory of American political life and of the court's
place in it. The theory stresses the right of each
citizen to participate on equal terms in the political
process; more important, it gives a specific
definition of what "equal participation" should be.
That's good news - even for those who don't fully
agree with the theory.
Ask yourself what the public pays Supreme
Court justices to do. The court is a well-funded
bureaucracy, assigned one relatively pleasurable
task: interpreting the Constitution and federal
statutes in the context of actual disputes. We want
the court's decisions to be "correct," whatever that
means; but it's at least as important that they be
clear. Society cannot live by law if it can't
understand it.
In these terms, the public hasn't gotten its
money's worth from the Rehnquist court. Having
gained almost complete control of its docket in
1988, the court has sharply cut back its case load
(only 75 cases this term, the lightest load since the
early 1950s). Of the cases it takes, it "decides" many
in a morass of plurality opinions, special
concurrences and partial dissents that are almost
incomprehensible even to trained specialists. Here,
for example is the beginning of the court's opinion
in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, a high-profile
affirmative-action case from the 1994-95 term:
"O'CONNOR, J., announced the judgment
of the Court and delivered an opinion with
respect to Parts I, II, r-A, 1-B, III-D, and IV,
which was for the Court except insofar as it
might be inconsistent with the views expressed
in the concurrence of SCALIA, J., and an
opinion with respect to Part I-C. Parts I, II,
H-A, H-B, E-D, and IV of that opinion were
joined by REHNQUIST, C. J., and KENNEDY
and THOMAS, JJ., and by SCALIA, J., to the
extent heretofore indicated; and Part H1-C was
joined by KENNEDY, J."
Everybody straight about that? I teach these
cases for a living, and I am still puzzling over that
one. The court's secretiveness and prestige hide its
squabbling from public view; but this kind of
gibberish is the judicial equivalent of the
self-indulgent congressional food fights that are
boffo with C-SPAN viewers. It's also a distinct
novelty in Supreme Court history. Chief Justice
John Marshall built the court's prestige in the early
1800s by refusing to allow dissents at all; the entire
decade of the 1930s -- a now-legendary time of
turmoil and ideological strife on the court --
produced fewer dissents and concurrences than are
announced in one term of the current court.
This year, however, the court spoke clearly, and
correctly, in two of its most important cases. Both
opinions probed beneath state rationalizations for
discrimination. Colorado defended its harsh
amendment as simply barring gays from "special
rights;" Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that "we
find nothing special in the protections Amendment
2 withholds ... Central both to the idea of the rule
of law and to our own Constitution's guarantee of
equal protection is the principle that government
and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms
to all who seek its assistance."
VMI's lawyers claimed that maintaining a
prestigious all-male school fostered "diversity";
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that a plan that
"serves the state's sons" but "makes no provisions
for its daughters" represents not diversity but
discrimination. VMI argued that the vast majority of
women would not profit from its harsh "adversative"
educational style. That was constitutionally
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irrelevant, said the court: "The question is whether
the State can constitutionally deny to women who
have the will and capacity, the training and attendant
opportunities that VMI uniquely affords .... There
is no reason to believe that the admission of women
capable of all the activities required of VMI cadets
would destroy that institute rather than enhances its
capacity to serve the "most perfect Union.'
Whether the court calls its inquiry "rational
relationship" review (as in the Colorado case) or
"skeptical scrutiny" (as in the case of VMI), its
opinions imply that it will carefully analyze
neutral-sounding legalisms offered to justify
unequal treatment. Its central theory seems to be
that every American has a right to carve out his or
her niche in society, without government
classifications that tilt the playing field. Gay people
and women pay the same taxes as others, cast the
same votes and salute the same flag; they must have
an equal chance -- not to win inclusion, but to fight
for it, whether in the state legislature or in the
admissions office of a college their taxes pay for.
The court's vision, though, is far from complete.
First Amendment questions still split the six-justice
center, and they have yet to propose a convincing
theory in cases involving race. Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy tend to view the Constitution as
mandating no more than individual equality, while
Justices Souter and Ginsburg seem to believe that a
history of discrimination may justify some remedial
measures. Confusion and factionalization may
persist in this crucial area on the bench as it does in
the nation at large - or the court may resolve it in
favor of a "color-blind" participation right that many
observers will find insensitive.
Nonetheless, the 1995-96 term may be
remembered as the time when court-watchers first
saw the light at the end of a long, dark tunnel. The
Reagan-Bush vision of a Supreme Court that would
enforce radical conservative values has definitively
failed. It was rejected as decisively by Republican
appointees (Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter) as
by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, President Clinton's
nominees.
But there will be no reflowering of Bill
Brennan-style liberalism either. If the Warren court
saw itself as defending individual rights, the new
court may come to see its own role as defending the
right of individuals to fight their own battles. This
right will take precedence over the rights of
governments to stack the political deck, whether in
defense of "traditional values," "states' rights" or
any other set of governmental interests.
For more than a quarter-century, the role of the
court has been an object of intense political dispute.
Out of that process may come a new view of the role
of courts - one that draws inspiration less from
political ideology than from the American tradition
of judicial independence. This term may mark the
moment when that new vision began to drift into
focus.
(Garrett Epps, a former reporter for The
Washington Post, teaches constitutional law at the
University of Oregon Law School.)
The Washington Post Copyright 1996
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COURT RULINGS ON RACE DISMAY CIVIL RIGHTS ADVOCATES
A LACK OF UNIFORM STANDARDS IS CITED
The Boston Globe
Friday, July 5, 1996
Ann Scales, Globe Staff
WASHINGTON - In a session that touched on
many of the pressure points of American life, the
Supreme Court handed down a thunderous
expression of intolerance for sex and gender bias
but was reluctant to wade deeper into race issues.
Civil rights advocates argued that the court
refused to apply the standards it set for sex and
gender bias to racial issues, leaving many of them to
say they dread the court's next term.
"I'm not particularly looking forward to cases
going to the Supreme Court these days," said
Theodore M. Shaw, associate director-counsel for
the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.
The justices handed gays and women victories
in two decisions -- one that struck down the
constitutionality of the all-male Virginia Military
Institute and another that overruled a statewide
referendum in Colorado that outlawed
discrimination against homosexuals.
At the same time, on matters of race, the court
continued what civil rights leaders say is a pattern of
chipping away at policies designed to protect the
constitutional rights of minorities. Those actions
included:
- Striking down three congressional districts in
Texas and one in North Carolina. The court's
opinion stated that legislative districts drawn to
increase the representation of racial and ethnic
minorities were unconstitutional.
- Deciding that death row inmates who have lost
their appeals in state court have only one
chance to appeal in federal court. Civil rights
leaders say the ruling will adversely affect
minorities, who make up a disproportionate
number of death row inmates.
- Allowing a lower-court ruling to stand that
struck down the affirmative action admissions
program at the University of Texas Law
School. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
David H. Souter took the unusual step of
explaining that the case was not accepted
because its central question was moot; the law
school no longer uses the program.
"Given the way the Supreme Court has been
going on racial discrimination cases," Shaw said,
"the fact that it chose to pass on this may be a
blessing in disguise."
Scott Bullock, staff attorney at the conservative
Institute for Justice, said it is "hard to generalize"
about the term. "There is really no consistency
running through a lot of the decisions this year," he
said. Bullock applauded the ruling on voting
districts, saying it struck down "racial
gerrymandering," but said he was perplexed by the
Colorado gay rights decision. "It opened up a lot of
questions that will have to be settled later," he said.
Charles Ogletree, a constitutional law professor
at Harvard Law School, said the justices' opinions
this term indicated they were "prepared to recognize
certain interest groups and yet basically turned their
heads on the issue of race. There is a disturbing
message for minorities."
Ron Daniels, executive director of the liberal
Center for Constitutional Rights, said the Supreme
Court this term "left black America in a quandary.
The court seems to reflect a kind of the consensus of
American society, that inclusiveness as a value has
broken down," he said. "The court has actually
turned the clock back for minorities," Daniels added.
Ogletree and Shaw said they would be watching
the court's October term for rulings in an Arizona
case that would make English the state's official
language, a voting rights case in Georgia and one on
disparity in sentencing involving crack cocaine.
"Race has always been the great American
divide and, although the race question isn't a bipolar
question anymore in that we live in a multiracial
society, the heart of the race question remains the
black-white divide," Shaw said.
But, more than that, Bullock said, the court term
"underscores how quickly the court could change
with a presidential election or the appointment of
even one or two other justices."
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SUPREME COURT CONSISTENT ON GROUP RIGHTS
International Herald Tribune
July 8, 1996
Joan Biskupic
In some of the biggest decisions of the recently
ended term, the Supreme Court followed a simple
rule: Government cannot treat people differently.
That meant states could not draw lines between
men and women, or homosexuals and heterosexuals,
or between blacks and whites.
The admonition against such distinctions came
in cases involving the Virginia Military Institute, an
anti-gay rights amendment in Colorado, and in black
and Hispanic congressional voting districts in North
Carolina and Texas. Each of these cases yielded
different votes and shifting coalitions, alternately
pleasing liberals and conservatives outside the
court, with the only constant being the votes of
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony M.
Kennedy in the majority.
With their generally conservative but pragmatic,
incremental approach, these two Ronald Reagan
appointees (Justice O'Connor in 1981, Justice
Kennedy in 1988) define the center and control the
court.
"They see serious constitutional problems with
policies that disadvantage people based on personal
characteristics and status rather than on their
individual merit," said Paul Gewirtz, a law professor
at Yale University. "This connects their skepticism
of most race-based affirmative action, which is
usually seen as 'conservative,' with their opposition
to the anti-gay rights amendment, which is typically
seen as 'liberal."'
At stake is how government classifies people, in
providing benefits or meting out punishment.
Virginia, for example, wanted to keep women out of
its elite military-style school, Virginia Military
Institute. Colorado wanted to prohibit municipalities
from enacting ordinances specifically protecting
homosexuals from discrimination. The court ruled
that homosexuals, like women in the Virginia
Military Institute case, cannot be singled out for
different treatment by government.
"A state cannot so deem a class of voters a
stranger to its laws," Justice Kennedy wrote in
Romer v. Evans, the case striking down Colorado's
prohibition on local gay rights laws.
In the blockbuster ruling of the term, the court,
by a 6-to-3, vote held that public "animus" toward
homosexuals did not justify treating them differently
under the law from anyone else.
When the justices later invalidated four
predominantly black and Hispanic congressional
districts, the majority suggested the states acted not
out of animus but on the basis of stereotypes.
As the court for the third time in four years
rejected districts drawn so that a majority of their
voters were black or Hispanic, Justice O'Connor
stressed that the nation's efforts to remedy race
discrimination and achieve a "colorblind" society are
not, in most cases, advanced with color-conscious
policies. "At the same time that we combat the
symptoms of racial polarization in politics," she
wrote, "we must strive to eliminate unnecessary
race-based state action that appears to endorse the
disease."
Civil-rights campaigners have protested that
such "minority majority" districts are needed to keep
up the numbers of black and Hispanic
representatives in Congress.
But Justice O'Connor wrote that the court
"cannot pick and choose in our efforts to eliminate
unjustified racial stereotyping by government
actors."
That view reinforces the race-neutral imperative
of a five-justice majority involving affirmative
action in contracting and other voting rights policies.
Justice John Paul Stevens, dissenting from these
rulings, asserted this term that the majority was
wrongly equating remedial efforts intended to
compensate blacks for past wrongs with poll taxes
and discrimination that kept blacks from voting only
a generation ago.
"While any racial classification may risk some
stereotyping," Justice Stevens wrote, "the risk of true
discrimination in this case is extremely tenuous in
light of the long history of resistance to giving
minorities a full voice in the political process."
The five justices who have struck down
government actions they considered too
race-conscious (Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist,
along with Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence
Thomas, O'Connor and Kennedy) have also pressed
to restrict the reach of the federal government.
They have repeatedly ruled that the federal
government overstepped its authority to right
wrongs in society.
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COURT DECLARES GAYS NOT LEGALLY DIFFERENT
Ruling Rejects Distinctions Based on Prejudice
The Washington Post
Wednesday, May 22, 1996
Joan Biskupic
At the heart of Monday's Supreme Court ruling
favoring gay rights was the premise that there is no
reason to treat homosexuals differently under the
law.
The court said implicitly that homosexuals are
not categorically bad or evil in a way that allows
government to exclude them from its benefits and
protections.
From this generally conservative court and at a
time when homosexuality remains a sensitive
subject within families and a fractious topic for
lawmakers, those views are nothing less than
remarkable.
"That's what makes the opinion as profound as
it is," said Douglas Kmiec, a Notre Dame law
professor and former Justice Department official in
the Reagan administration. "I think this was an
effort by the majority to cut off other arguments. I
think they want to resolve it at its core."
Georgetown University law professor Chai
Feldblum, who is also legal counsel to the Human
Rights Campaign, said of the court's view that
homosexuals should not be singled out and that
public prejudice cannot justify government
discrimination: "To many of us in the [gay rights]
movement this seems a single basic truth. But this
is revolutionary in the law."
The justices themselves signaled they thought
they were starting something big when they voted 6
to 3 to strike down a Colorado constitutional
amendment that barred cities from protecting
homosexuals from discrimination.
The author of the opinion, Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy, began with reference to the powerful
admonition of Justice John Marshall Harlan's
dissent in the 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson, which
upheld separate accommodations for blacks and
whites. Harlan said the Constitution "neither knows
nor tolerates classes among citizens."
Kennedy equated gay rights with civil rights
throughout and said public "animus" toward
homosexuals is not legitimate grounds for
discrimination. The opinion referred nowhere to the
court's only other major gay rights case, the 1986
Bowers v. Hardwick, which said states could make
certain homosexual conduct a crime and declared
the Constitution does not protect private consensual
relations between people of the same sex.
The five other justices who signed Kennedy's
opinion declined to write separately -- a sign that
they wanted to put their full weight behind the
majority statement, which was a relatively brief 14
pages and written with unusual forcefulness.
Justice Antonin Scalia, who wrote the statement
of the three dissenting justices and took the unusual
step of reading portions of it from the bench, angrily
observed that the majority was putting "the prestige
of this institution" behind equal rights for
homosexuals.
How the principles of equality voiced this week
will affect lawsuits over whether gay people may
many each other, the military can exclude
homosexuals, or employers can deny jobs based on
sexual preference will be seen only as cases wend
through the courts. Cultural notions of heterosexual
marriage and the court's traditional deference to the
military in its affairs will plainly affect some
disputes.
"Now governments defending discrimination
against gay people have a higher burden," Stanford
University law professor Kathleen Sullivan said
yesterday. "They must say, 'we are doing this for a
good reason, not just because our troops are
uncomfortable with gay people.' In the marriage
context, the reason can't be dislike or distaste for
gay people."
The case of Romer v. Evans began in 1992
when Colorado voters adopted a constitutional
amendment that forbade local governments from
enacting ordinances prohibiting bias based on
sexual orientation. Colorado officials had argued
that such ordinances gave gay people "special
protection."
But Kennedy rejected the idea that there was
anything special about the protection granted
homosexuals in the municipal anti-discrimination
ordinances. To the contrary, he said, that cities such
as Denver and Aspen simply had guaranteed
homosexuals access to the political process. "We
find nothing special in the protections Amendment
2 withholds. These are protections taken for granted
by most people either because they already have
them or do not need them," Kennedy, a 1988 Ronald
Reagan appointee, wrote. "These are protections
against exclusion from an almost limitless number
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of transactions and endeavors that constitute
ordinary civil life in a free society."
While today's Supreme Court is strongly
conservative, this week's ruling shows how tough
social policy issues defy the norm. Four years ago,
Kennedy and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor (a
1981 Reagan appointee) and David H. Souter (a
1990 appointee of George Bush) broke from their
conservative brethren to uphold a right to abortion.
This week O'Connor and Souter joined Kennedy, as
did Clinton appointees Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen G. Breyer and John Paul Stevens, a 1975
Gerald Ford appointee and the most senior of
today's liberal-leaning bloc.
Scalia was joined by Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist (appointed by Richard M. Nixon in 1972
and elevated to chief by Reagan in 1986) and
Clarence Thomas (George Bush's 1991 appointee).
Scalia accused the majority of being "so long on
emotive utterance and so short on relevant legal
citation." Scalia relied on the 1986 Bowers case and
said, "If it is constitutionally permissible for a state
to make homosexual conduct criminal, surely it is
constitutionally permissible for a state to enact other
laws merely disfavoring homosexual conduct."
" . . . Of course it is our moral heritage that one
should not hate any human being or class of human
beings," Scalia wrote. "But I had thought that one
could consider certain conduct reprehensible --
murder, for example, or polygamy, or cruelty to
animals -- and could exhibit even 'animus' toward
such conduct Surely that is the only sort of 'animus'
at issue here: moral disapproval of homosexual
conduct, the same sort of moral disapproval that
produced the centuries-old criminal laws that we
held constitutional in Bowers."
The Washington Post Copyright 1996
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ANTI-GAY AMENDMENT STRUCK DOWN
U.S. Supreme Court Votes 6-3 to Nullify Colorado Measure
The Baltimore Sun
Tuesday, May 21, 1996
Lyle Denniston
WASHINGTON - Giving gay-rights advocates
a breakthrough victory after a nearly three-decade
campaign for legal protection, the Supreme Court
ruled yesterday that the Constitution assures
homosexuals a measure of equality in the nation's
public life.
In the first-ever Supreme Court decision
favoring a major homosexual-rights cause, the
court's 6-3 vote struck down the most pervasive
form of inequality for gay men, lesbians and
bisexuals.
It nullified a Colorado constitutional
amendment that denied those individuals nearly all
forms of government protection against
discrimination based on their sexual identities. All
existing gay-rights laws in the state would have
been repealed, and no new ones could have been
created except by amending the state's constitution.
That amendment was one of a series of
voter-initiated attempts across the country to wipe
out gains that gay-rights activists have made in the
enactment of anti-bias laws or policies at the state
and local level.
Colorado's amendment, Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy said for the majority, "classifies
homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end
but to make them unequal to everyone else. A state
cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its
laws."
Because the ruling appeared to be shaped
narrowly to deal with Colorado's far-ranging attack
on gay political action, it left much to be decided in
future cases.
The decision contained no hints, for example,
about the fate of the current policy -- the "don't ask,
don't tell" rule -- that bars most homosexuals from
the military. The decision also does not address
other public policies that treat homosexuals
differently, such as the denial of the option to marry
legally, to teach in public schools, to have custody
of children, and to have equal access to housing and
jobs.
Gay-rights activists claimed a major legal
breakthrough. Matthew Coles of the American Civil
Liberties Union said the decision "marks a sea
change in the struggle of lesbians and gay men for
equality in America. It establishes as a general
principle that lesbians and gay men are entitled to
the same constitutional protections granted to
everyone else."
Activists on the other side railed against the
court. Gary L. Bauer, president of the Family
Research Council, called the ruling the work of "an
out-of-control, unelected judiciary." He added that it
"should send chills down the back of anyone who
cares whether the people of this nation any longer
have the power of self-rule."
Kennedy read dispassionately a summary of his
ruling from the bench. Then, speaking nearly twice
as long, Justice Antonin Scalia read much of his
dissenting opinion. The dissent was a scathing
denunciation of the court for making new law and
for disparaging the moral sentiments of the people
of Colorado.
"I think it no business of the courts to take sides
in this culture war," Scalia said.
Kennedy's majority included Justices Stephen
G. Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sandra Day
O'Connor, David H. Souter and John Paul Stevens.
Joining Scalia in dissent were Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas.
Since the gay-rights movement began as a
political force after the riots sparked by a police raid
on a gay bar, the Stonewall Inn, in New York City's
Greenwich Village in 1969, the issue of homosexual
rights under the Constitution has raised two core
legal questions. The court touched on only one of
those yesterday.
One issue is whether homosexuals are, like
racial minorities or women, entitled to direct
constitutional protection against government
discrimination and, if so, how much protection they
should get: the full guarantee of equality for
minorities when race is used to deny rights, or the
lesser guarantee of some equality for women when
gender is used to deny rights.
That is the issue behind the most controversial
disputes over gay rights: the challenge to
discrimination against homosexuals in the military,
and the plea for the right of homosexuals to marry
or to have legal recognition for gay partnerships.
The court made only a small beginning
yesterday in defining the constitutional status of
homosexuality. And in doing so, it made no mention
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of the issues of gays in the military or same-sex
marriage and partnerships.
Relying heavily on a brief submitted in the
Colorado case by a group of law professors and
written by Laurence H. Tribe of Harvard, the court
said the Constitution does not allow government to
pick "a single named group" and impose upon that
group alone a broad "disability."
Whether the group is identifiable as
homosexuals, or by some other single trait, the
Constitution does not allow government to deny
such a group protection "across the board."
The court did not have to say whether the
Constitution extends more than this general form of
equality to homosexuals. Still, the court never
before had said that homosexuals share in that
broad guarantee against discrimination.
The second major issue on gay rights is whether
gay men and lesbians have any constitutional right
to privacy we they engage in sexual activity. That
part of the rights campaign has not fared well in the
courts.
The most important Supreme Court ruling on
gay rights before yesterday was a 1986 decision that
homosexuals have no right of privacy that shields
them from criminal prosecution for private sexual
acts.
The Supreme Court's majority made no mention
of that ruling yesterday. But Scalia argued that it
should have led the court to uphold the Colorado
amendment: If states are free to make gay sexual
activity a crime, he said, surely they should be free
to write laws limiting homosexual political activity.
The Baltimore Sun Copyright 1996
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THE GAY RIGHTS RULING
Excerpts From Court's Decision on Colorado's Provision for Homosexuals
The New York Times
Copyright 1996
Tuesday, May 21, 1996
Following are excerpts from the Supreme Court's decision today in Romer v. Evans, declaring
unconstitutional a Colorado state constitutional provision that nullified civil rights laws singling out
homosexuals for protection. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by
Justices John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G.
Breyer. Justice Antonin Scalia's dissenting opinion was joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and
Justice Clarence Thomas.
FROM THE DECISION By Justice Kennedy
One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this Court that the Constitution "neither knows
nor tolerates classes among citizens." Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) (dissenting opinion). Unheeded then, those
words now are understood to state a commitment to the law's neutrality where the rights of persons are at
stake. The Equal Protection Clause enforces this principle and today requires us to hold invalid a provision
of Colorado's Constitution.
The enactment challenged in this case is an amendment to the Constitution of the State of Colorado,
adopted in a 1992 statewide referendum. The parties and the state courts refer to it as "Amendment 2," its
designation when submitted to the voters. The impetus for the amendment and the contentious campaign that
preceded its adoption came in large part from ordinances that had been passed in various Colorado
municipalities.... What gave rise to the statewide controversy was the protection the ordinances afforded
to persons discriminated against by reason of their sexual orientation. Amendment 2 repeals these ordinances
to the extent they prohibit discrimination on the basis of "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation,
conduct, practices or relationships."
Yet Amendment 2, in explicit terms, does more than repeal or rescind these provisions. It prohibits all
legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect the named
class....
Soon after Amendment 2 was adopted, this litigation to declare its invalidity and enjoin its enforcement
was commenced in the District Court for the City and County of Denver....
The trial court granted a preliminary injunction to stay enforcement of Amendment 2, and an appeal was
taken to the Supreme Court of Colorado. Sustaining the interim injunction and remanding the case for further
proceedings, the State Supreme Court held that Amendment 2 was subject to strict scrutiny under the 14th
Amendment because it infringed the fundamental right of gays and lesbians to participate in the political
process... . On remand, the state advanced various arguments in an effort to show that Amendment 2 was
narrowly tailored to serve compelling interests, but the trial court found none sufficient. It enjoined
enforcement of Amendment 2, and the Supreme Court of Colorado, in a second opinion, affirmed the ruling.
Evans v. Romer. We granted certiorari and now affirm the judgment, but on a rationale different from that
adopted by the State Supreme Court.
The state's principal argument in defense of Amendment 2 is that it puts gays and lesbians in the same
position as all other persons. So, the state says, the measure does no more than deny homosexuals special
rights. This reading of the amendment's language is implausible....
Sweeping and comprehensive is the change in legal status effected by this law. So much is evident from
the ordinances that the Colorado Supreme Court declared would be void by operation of Amendment 2.
Homosexuals, by state decree, are put in a solitary class with respect to transactions and relations in both the
private and governmental spheres. The amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific
legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and
policies....
We cannot accept the view that Amendment 2's prohibition on specific legal protections does no more
than deprive homosexuals of special rights. To the contrary, the amendment imposes a special disability upon
those persons alone. Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without
constraint. . . . We find nothing special in the protections Amendment 2 withholds. These are protections
taken for granted by most people either because they already have them or do not need them....
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The 14th Amendment's promise that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws must
co-exist with the practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting
disadvantage to various groups or persons. We have attempted to reconcile the principle with the reality by
stating that, if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the
legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.
Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry. First, the amendment has the peculiar
property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group.... Second, its sheer
breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything
but animus toward the class ...
By requiring that the classification bear a rational relationship to an independent and legitimate
legislative end, we insure that classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group
burdened by the law.
Amendment 2 confounds this normal process of judicial review. It is at once too narrow and too broad.
It identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection across the board....
It is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort. Central both to the idea of the rule
of law and to our own Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and each
of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance. Respect for this principle explains
why laws singling out a certain class of citizens for disfavored legal status or general hardships are rare. A
law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid
from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense. "The guaranty
of 'equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.'"
Laws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of
animosity toward the class of persons affected. "[I]f the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the
laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . .. desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest." Even laws enacted for broad and ambitious
purposes often can be explained by reference to legitimate public policies which justify the incidental
disadvantages they impose on certain persons. Amendment 2, however, in making a general announcement
that gays and lesbians shall not have any particular protections from the law, inflicts on them immediate,
continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie any legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it. We
conclude that, in addition to the far-reaching deficiencies of Amendment 2 that we have noted, the principles
it offends, in another sense, are conventional and venerable; a law must bear a rational relationship to a
legitimate governmental purpose, and Amendment 2 does not.
The primary rationale the state offers for Amendment 2 is respect for other citizens' freedom of
association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or religious objections
to homosexuality. Colorado also cites its interest in conserving resources to fight discrimination against other
groups. The breadth of the amendment is so far removed from these particular justifications that we find it
impossible to credit them....
We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but
to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A state cannot so deem a class of persons
a stranger to its laws. Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause, and the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Colorado is affirmed.
FROM THE DISSENT By Justice Scalia
The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite. The constitutional amendment before us here
is not the manifestation of a "bare ... desire to harm" homosexuals, ante, but is rather a modest attempt by
seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically
powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the laws....
In holding that homosexuality cannot be singled out for disfavorable treatment, the Court contradicts a
decision, unchallenged here, pronounced only 10 years ago, see Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), and places the
prestige of this institution behind the proposition that opposition to homosexuality is as reprehensible as
racial or religious bias. Whether it is or not, is precisely the cultural debate that gave rise to the Colorado
constitutional amendment (and to the preferential laws against which the amendment was directed). Since
the Constitution of the United States says nothing about this subject, it is left to be resolved by normal
democratic means, including the democratic adoption of provisions in state constitutions. This Court has no
business imposing upon all Americans the resolution favored by the elite class from which the members of
this institution are selected, pronouncing that "animosity" toward homosexuality, ante, is evil. I vigorously
dissent....
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The central thesis of the Court's reasoning is that any group is denied equal protection when, to obtain
advantage (or, presumably, to avoid disadvantage), it must have recourse to a more general and hence more
difficult level of political decision-making than others.... [I]t seems to me most unlikely that any multi-level
democracy can function under such a principle. For whenever a disadvantage is imposed, or conferral of a
benefit is prohibited, at one of the higher levels of democratic decision-making (i.e., by the state legislature
rather than local government, or by the people at large in the state constitution rather than the legislature),
the affected group has (under this theory) been denied equal protection.... The Court's entire novel theory
rests upon the proposition that there is something special .. . in making a disadvantaged group (or a
nonpreferred group) resort to a higher decision-making level. That proposition finds no support in law or
logic....
The case most relevant to the issue before us today is not even mentioned in the Court's opinion: In
Bowers v. Hardwick we held that the Constitution does not prohibit ... making homosexual conduct a
crime.. .. If it is constitutionally permissible for a state to make homosexual conduct criminal, surely it is
constitutionally permissible for a state to enact other laws merely disfavoring homosexual conduct... . And
afortior it is constitutionally permissible for a state to adopt a provision not even disfavoring homosexual
conduct, but merely prohibiting all levels of state government from bestowing special protections upon
homosexual conduct... .
No principle set forth in the Constitution . .. prohibits what Colorado has done here. But the case for
Colorado is much stronger than that What it has done is not only unprohibited, but eminently reasonable....
The Court's opinion contains grim, disapproving hints that Coloradans have been guilty of "animus" or
"animosity" toward homosexuality. .. . Of course it is our moral heritage that one should not hate any human
being or class of human beings. But I had thought that one could consider certain conduct reprehensible --
murder, for example, or polygamy, or cruelty to animals -- and could exhibit even "animus" toward such
conduct.... The Colorado amendment does not, to speak entirely precisely, prohibit giving favored status
to people who are homosexuals; they can be favored for many reasons - for example, because they are senior
citizens or members of racial minorities. But it prohibits giving them favored status because of their
homosexual conduct ...
[Tjhough Coloradans are, as I say, entitled to be hostile toward homosexual conduct, the fact is that the
degree of hostility reflected by Amendment 2 is the smallest conceivable. The Court's portrayal of Coloradans
as a society fallen victim to pointless, hate-filled "gay-bashing" is so false as to be comical. Colorado not only
is one of the 25 states that have repealed their anti-sodomy laws, but was among the first to do so. But the
society that eliminates criminal punishment for homosexual acts does not necessarily abandon the view that
homosexuality is morally wrong and socially harmful....
There is a problem, however, which arises when criminal sanction of homosexuality is eliminated but
moral and social disapprobation of homosexuality is meant to be retained. . .. Because those who engage in
homosexual conduct tend to reside in disproportionate numbers in certain communities, have high disposable
income and of course care about homosexual-rights issues much more ardently than the public at large, they
possess political power much greater than their numbers, both locally and statewide. Quite understandably,
they devote this political power to achieving not merely a grudging social toleration, but full social
acceptance, of homosexuality....
I do not mean to be critical of these legislative successes; homosexuals are as entitled to use the legal
system for reinforcement of their moral sentiments as are the rest of society. But they are subject to being
countered by lawful, democratic countermeasures as well.
That is where Amendment 2 came in. It sought to counter both the geographic concentration and the
disproportionate political power of homosexuals by (1) resolving the controversy at the statewide level, and
(2) making the election a single-issue contest for both sides. It put directly, to all the citizens of the state, the
question, Should homosexuality be given special protection? They answered no. The Court today asserts that
this most democratic of procedures is unconstitutional. ...
Todays opinion has no foundation in American constitutional law, and barely pretends to. The people
of Colorado have adopted an entirely reasonable provision which does not even disfavor homosexuals in any
substantive sense, but merely denies them preferential treatment. Amendment 2 is designed to prevent
piecemeal deterioration of the sexual morality favored by a majority of Coloradans, and is not only an
appropriate means to that legitimate end, but a means that Americans have employed before. Striking it down
is an act not of judicial judgment, but of political will.
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COURT RULING BREAKS ALL-MALE SCHOOL BARRIERS
Decision Expected to Open VMI, Citadel to Qualified Women
The Herald-Sun (Durham, N.C.)
Thursday, June 27, 1996
Aaron Epstein, Knight-Ridder
WASHINGTON -- Women broke through the
last bastion of all-male public education Wednesday
when the Supreme Court overwhelmingly declared
that they cannot be excluded from the Virginia
Military Institute -- nor relegated to a "pale
imitation" of it.
The 7-1 ruling is expected to open both VMI
and The Citadel in South Carolina to women. Those
venerable, strict military-style institutions,
renowned for training men to be leaders, are the
only remaining state colleges that limit classes to
one sex.
"The constitutional violation in this case is the
categorical exclusion of women from an
extraordinary educational opportunity afforded
men," declared Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who
as a civil rights lawyer a generation ago argued in
the Supreme Court for equality for women.
"What has been rejected is what Virginia
attempted to create -- one high-quality institution
for men and one substandard institution for
women," said Attorney General Janet Reno, whose
Justice Department led the legal fight against VMI's
gender discrimination.
Because the court did not decide the
constitutionality of separate -- but equal -- state
schools for men and women, Virginia theoretically
could set up a women's program identical to VMI's.
However, experts said that would be a practical
impossibility, and Deval Patrick, head of the Justice
Department's civil rights division, said, "admitting
women to VMI is the only remedy that fits the
Constitution."
George Allen, Virginia's Republican governor,
said, "the nation's highest court has spoken, and we
need to bring Virginia into compliance." He said he
would consult with state officials and VMI "to
determine an appropriate course of action."
Officials at The Citadel declined to comment.
But the speaker of the South Carolina House, Rep.
David Wilkins, said, "it appears to me there's no
other option" than to admit women to The Citadel.
VMI, founded 157 years ago in Lexington, Va.,
is the oldest military institution in the nation. It
operates unusually rigorous, regimented, Spartan
and stressful programs designed to produce
"citizen-soldiers." Confederate Gen. Thomas
"Stonewall" Jackson taught there and Gen. George
C. Marshall, World War II and postwar soldier and
diplomat, is its most illustrious alumnus. The loyalty
of its graduates has produced the largest per-student
endowment of U.S. undergraduate schools.
The Justice Department, prompted by a
complaint from a female high-school student eager
to attend VMI, filed suit in 1990 to open the school
to women. Virginia sought to preserve VMI's
all-male heritage by arguing that its deliberately
hostile, high-pressure, physically rigorous military
environment would be inappropriate for educating
most women, who were said to prefer cooperative
methods.
But Ginsburg, announcing the decision from the
bench in slow, firm tones, said generalizations and
stereotypes about the "typical" man or woman "will
not suffice to deny opportunity to women whose
talent and capacity place them outside the average
description." Some women would want to attend
VMI, can meet its requirements and would flourish
there, she said. To afford them equal protection of
the laws, as required by the Constitution's 14th
Amendment, they "cannot be offered anything less,"
Ginsburg observed.
Yet Virginia did offer women something much
less, she said. It created "a pale shadow of VMI
in ... the range of curricular choices and faculty
stature, funding, prestige, alumni support and
influence." The state set up a parallel program for
women at Mary Baldwin College, a private women's
college in Staunton, Va. A Richmond, Va.-based
federal appeals court upheld the separate program as
"substantively comparable," and 41 women attended
classes in the 1995-96 school year. (In South
Carolina, 22 women enrolled in a similar program
apart from The Citadel, at all-female Converse
College in Spartanburg.)
Justice Antonin Scalia was the sole dissenter in
Wednesday's decision.
The success of women as students in the Army,
Navy and Air Force academies, and as members of
the armed forces considerably weakened Virginia's
effort to keep them out of VMI, the court said.
Justice Clarence Thomas disqualified himself
from the case. His son, Jamal, is a senior at VMI.
Ginsburg likened the Mary Baldwin program to
the unconstitutional attempt by Texas 50 years ago
to set up a separate, unaccredited law school for
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blacks who were refused admission to the flagship
University of Texas Law School. "Virginia's remedy
affords no cure at all for the opportunities and
advantages withheld from women who want a VMI
education and can make the grade," Ginsburg said.
The appeals court's "substantive comparability"
test was wrong, she said. Defenders of a
gender-based law or policy must prove that it
"serves important governmental objectives" and is
"substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives," she said. In addition, Ginsburg said, the
government must demonstrate an "exceedingly
persuasive justification" for such gender
discrimination.
Scalia argued that Ginsburg's use of that
language served to "load the dice" against
gender-based acts of government.
Justices John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day
O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter and
Steven Breyer joined Ginsburg's opinion.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist agreed with
the result but not the reasoning. Virginia's
constitutional failure was not the exclusion of
women from VMI but the offer of an alternative to
women that was "distinctly inferior," he said. It
would be sufficient, he concluded, to provide a
separate school with "the same quality of education"
as VMI.
Although the VMI decision was limited to state
colleges and universities, numerous private schools
for men or women feared it could have an adverse
impact on them because they accept government
money or tax breaks.
Cathleen Cleaver, director of legal studies at the
conservative Family Research Council, which
supported Virginia, said the ruling would make it
difficult for private schools to set up athletic or
other programs for men or women only. "If you
accept federal money, you lose," she said.
Some feminist groups also expressed
disappointment. Kathy Rodgers, executive director
of the National Organization for Women Legal
Defense Fund, said the court failed to heed its
request to give women the highest legal protection
against discrimination, a level given to racial
minorities. '"The ruling doesn't go as far as we hoped
it would," she said.
Copyright 1996 Knight Ridder Tribune
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THE VMI RULING
Court: Women Can Go to VMI
The Baltimore Sun
Thursday, June 27, 1996
Lyle Denniston
WASHINGTON -- Writing into the
Constitution a new layer of protection for equality
of the sexes, the Supreme Court yesterday ordered
the Virginia Military Institute to open its cadet
ranks to women, probably ending the institute's 157
years as a place only for men. The 7-1 ruling is
based on the Constitution's guarantee of legal
equality, applying to any government-run institution
or one that relies on public money.
It seems sure to apply to the only other
single-sex military college operated by a state with
state money, The Citadel in Charleston, S.C. Young
women are applying even now to go to VMI or The
Citadel, and some of them are now likely to become
cadets.
Seven years after an anonymous Virginia
woman was rebuffed in a bid to attend VMI, setting
off the legal battle that ended yesterday, the court
ruled that a state college or public school that is
"unique" cannot constitutionally be reserved for just
one sex. It did so by spelling out a new, and tougher,
constitutional "measuring rod" for judging
discrimination based solely on sex. Attorney
General Janet Reno said the court "overwhelmingly
has given life to the promise in the Constitution that
all of us deserve an equal shot at educational
opportunity." The Justice Department has been
challenging VMI's ban on women for six years.
VMPs superintendent, Maj. Gen. Josiah
Bunting III, called the ruling a great disappointment.
"The institute teaches respect for duly constituted
authority," he said, "and we shall discharge our
responsibilities under the court's order."
Although yesterday's ruling dealt directly only
with equality in public higher education, it was
sweeping in scope. It is likely to encourage lawsuits
against differing treatments of the sexes in other
government programs, including the military. Some
language in the ruling made it appear that it would
not go so far as to nullify all single-sex education in
public colleges or public schools, though some
critics of the decision said they feared it would do
exactly that.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a one-time
women's rights lawyer who three years ago became
the second woman to serve on the court, wrote the
ruling that seemed to push the court closer to
establishing an equal rights guarantee as part of the
Constitution. "The court today is making the
Constitution's guarantee of equality real for women
because it toughens significantly the standard of
review" for sex bias, said Janet Gallagher, director
of the American Civil Liberties Union's Women's
Rights Project, which Ginsburg had founded and led
before she became a federal judge.
Critics also noticed the ruling's breadth.
"The Supreme Court effectually instituted the
Equal Rights Amendment," said Robert L.
Maginnis, a senior policy analyst at the Family
Research Council. He noted that an equal rights
amendment had failed to win ratification. "The
Supreme Court bypassed the Constitution," he said.
The court said that all laws or government
policies that treat the sexes differently, based solely
on sex, are unconstitutional unless they have an "an
exceedingly persuasive justification" -- a standard
the court said could not be met by relying on
assumptions or stereotypes about the capacities of
men or women. "Generalizations about 'the way
women are,' estimates of what is appropriate for
most women," Ginsburg said, "no longer justify
denying opportunity to women whose talent and
capacity place them outside the average
description."
The VMI lawsuit, and a companion case in
lower courts that challenges exclusion of women
from The Citadel, symbolize a new debate over the
status of women under the Constitution's guarantee
of "equal protection of the laws." The court first
applied that guarantee to women in 1971. But it
never interpreted it as broadly as it did yesterday.
Confronting VMI's long tradition as a training
school for future male leaders, Ginsburg said the
Lexington, Va., institution had followed a "historic
and constant plan -- a plan to afford a unique
educational benefit only to males."
However much that "serves the state's sons, it
makes no provision whatever for her daughters," she
said. "That is not equal protection."
Rejecting Virginia's claims that it had not
violated women's rights by keeping them out of
VMI, and its argument that it should be allowed to
set up a program for women somewhere else, the
court ordered VMI to admit women.
A separate program for women, opening last
fall at Mary Baldwin College, a private women's
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college in Staunton, "does not match the
constitutional violation" in keeping them out of the
unique program at VMI, the court ruled. "Women
seeking and fit for a VMI-quality education cannot
be offered anything less," it said.
Ginsburg conceded that most women might not
want to attend VMI, which stresses sometimes
harsh treatment of cadets, in an atmosphere of little
privacy, with the aim of molding them into
"citizen-soldiers." Many men might not want
that, either, she said, but that is not the issue. The
question is whether women who are "ready, willing
and able" to succeed at VMI can be denied by a
state the "opportunities that VMI uniquely affords."
The court rejected arguments that women wouldn't
be up to the stresses of the program and that VMI
would have to change to accommodate them.
Because the opinion stressed the "unique"
program and prestige of VMI, it did not appear to
rule out all forms of single-sex education in public
colleges or schools. A footnote in the main opinion
said the court was not questioning government
approaches to "diverse educational opportunities,"
including single-sex schooling.
Maginnis suggested that the ruling "may
invalidate all 87 single-sex educational facilities"
across the nation, including 82 that exist for
females.
While the decision appears to leave VI and
The Citadel with the option of keeping women out
by becoming private institutions, both say they
could not afford to do without public money.
Ginsburg's opinion was supported by Justices
Stephen G. Breyer, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra
Day O'Connor, David H. Souter and John Paul
Stevens.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist agreed, in a
separate opinion, that VMI had acted
unconstitutionally and that the program at Mary
Baldwin College was not a remedy. But he rejected
the new sex-bias standard of the majority and said
he would not necessarily require VMI to admit
women as the only remedy.
Justice Antonin Scalia, the lone dissenter,
denounced the ruling, saying "it drastically revises
our established standards for reviewing sex-based
classifications." He said the decision "shuts down an
institution that has served the people of the
Commonwealth of Virginia with pride and
distinction for over a century and a half."
The ninth justice, Clarence Thomas, took no
part in the case, apparently because his son, Jamal,
attends VMI.
The Baltimore Sun Copyright 1996
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THE SUPREME COURT
Excerpts From High Court's Ruling Against the Male-Only Policy of V.M.I.
The New York Times
Thursday, June 27, 1996
Following are excerpts from the Supreme Court's decision today in United States v. Virginia, holding
that the equal protection guarantee of the 14th Amendment requires admission of women to the all-male
Virginia Military Institute.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion; which was joined by Justices John Paul
Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter and Stephen G. Breyer. Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist filed a separate concurring opinion. Justice Antonin Scalia dissented. Justice Clarence
Thomas did not participate in the case.
FROM THE DECISION By Justice Ginsburg
Virginia's public institutions of higher learning include an incomparable military college, Virginia
Military Institute (V.M.I.). The United States maintains that the Constitution's equal protection guarantee
precludes Virginia from reserving exclusively to men the unique educational opportunities V.M.I. affords.
We agree.
Founded in 1839, V.M.I. is today the sole single-sex school among Virginia's 15 public institutions of
higher learning. V.M.I.'s distinctive mission is to produce "citizen-soldiers," men prepared for leadership in
civilian life and in military service. V.M.I. pursues this mission through pervasive training of a kind not
available anywhere else in Virginia.
Assigning prime place to character development, V.M.I. uses an "adversative method" modeled on
English public schools and once characteristic of military instruction. V.M.I. constantly endeavors to instill
physical and mental discipline in its cadets and impart to them a strong moral code. The school's graduates
leave V.M.I. with heightened comprehension of their capacity to deal with duress and stress and a large sense
of accomplishment for completing the hazardous course.
V.M.L has notably succeeded in its mission to produce leaders; among its alumni are military generals,
members of Congress and business executives. The school's alumni overwhelmingly perceive that their
V.M.I. training helped them to realize their personal goals. V.M.I.'s endowment reflects the loyalty of its
graduates; V.M.I. has the largest per-student endowment of all undergraduate institutions in the nation.
Neither the goal of producing citizen-soldiers nor V.M.I.'s implementing methodology is inherently
unsuitable to women. And the school's impressive record in producing leaders has made admission desirable
to some women. Nevertheless, Virginia has elected to preserve exclusively for men the advantages and
opportunities a V.M.I. education affords....
We note, once again, the core instruction of this Court's path-marking decisions in J.E.B. v. Alabama:
Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" for that action....
The burden ofjustification is demanding and it rests entirely on the state. The state must show "at least
that the (challenged) classification serves 'important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory
means employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.' " The justification must
be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females. ...
"Inherent differences" between men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for
celebration, but not for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual's
opportunity. Sex classifications may be used to compensate women "for particular economic disabilities (they
have) suffered," to "promot(e) equal employment opportunity," to advance full development of the talent and
capacities of our nation's people. But such classifications may not be used, as they once were to create or
perpetuate the legal, social and economic inferiority of women.
Measuring the record in this case against the review standard just described, we conclude that Virginia
has shown no "exceedingly persuasive justification" for excluding all women from the citizen-soldier training
afforded by V.M.I. We therefore affirm the Fourth Circuit's initial judgment, which held that Virginia had
violated the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause. Because the remedy proffered by Virginia, the Mary
Baldwin V.W.I.L. [Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership] program, does not cure the constitutional
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violation, i.e., it does not provide equal opportunity, we reverse the Fourth Circuit's final judgment in this
case.
The Fourth Circuit initially held that Virginia had advanced no state policy by which it could justify,
under equal protection principles, its determination "to afford V.M.I.'s unique type of program to men and
not to women" Virginia challenges that "liability" ruling and asserts two justifications in defense of V.M.I.'s
exclusion of women.
First, the commonwealth contends, "single-sex education provides important educational benefits," and
the option of single-sex education contributes to "diversity in educational approaches." Second, the
commonwealth argues, "the unique V.M.I. method of character development and leadership training," the
school's adversative approach, would have to be modified were V.M.I. to admit women. We consider these
two justifications in turn.
Single-sex education affords pedagogical benefits to at least some students, Virginia emphasizes, and
that reality is uncontested in this litigation. Similarly, it is not disputed that diversity among public
educational institutions can serve the public good. But Virginia has not shown that V.M.I. was established,
or has been maintained, with a view to diversifying, by its categorical exclusion of women, educational
opportunities within the state. In cases of this genre, our precedent instructs that "benign" justifications
proffered in defense of categorical exclusions will not be accepted automatically; a tenable justification must
describe actual state purposes, not rationalizations for actions in fact differently grounded....
A purpose genuinely to advance an array of educational options, as the court of appeals recognized, is
not served by V.M.I.'s historic and constant plan, a plan to "affor(d) a unique educational benefit only to
males." However "liberally" this plan serves the state's sons, it makes no provision whatever for her
daughters. That is not equal protection.
Virginia next argues that V.M.I.'s adversative method of training provides educational benefits that
cannot be made available, unmodified, to women. Alterations to accommodate women would necessarily be
"radical," so "drastic," Virginia asserts, as to transform, indeed "destroy," V.M.I.'s program....
Education, to be sure, is not a "one size fits all" business. The issue, however, is not whether "women
or men should be forced to attend V.M.I."; rather, the question is whether the state can constitutionally deny
to women who have the will and capacity, the training and attendant opportunities that V.M.I. uniquely
affords....
Women's successful entry into the Federal military academies, and their participation in the nation's
military forces, indicate that Virginia's fears for the future of V.M.I. may not be solidly grounded. The state's
justification for excluding all women from "citizen-soldier" training for which some are qualified, in any
event, cannot rank as "exceedingly persuasive," as we have explained and applied that standard....
In the second phase of the litigation, Virginia presented its remedial plan: maintain V.M.I. as a male-only
college and create V.W.I.L. (Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership) as a separate program for women.
The plan met district court approval. The Fourth Circuit, in turn, deferentially reviewed the state's proposal
and decided that the two single-sex programs directly served Virginia's reasserted purposes: single-gender
education, and "achieving the results of an adversative method in a military environment." Inspecting the
V.M.I. and V.W.I.L. educational programs to determine whether they "afford(ed) to both genders benefits
comparable in substance, (if) not in form and detail," the court of appeals concluded that Virginia had
arranged for men and women opportunities "sufficiently comparable" to survive equal protection evaluation.
The United States challenges this "remedial" ruling as pervasively misguided.
A remedial decree, this court has said, must closely fit the constitutional violation; it must be shaped to
place persons unconstitutionally denied an opportunity or advantage in "the position they would have
occupied in the absence of (discrimination)." The constitutional violation in this case is the categorical
exclusion of women from an extraordinary educational opportunity afforded men. A proper remedy for an
unconstitutional exclusion, we have explained, aims to "eliminate (so far as possible) the discriminatory
effects of the past" and to "bar like discrimination in the future."
Virginia chose not to eliminate, but to leave untouched, V.M.I.'s exclusionary policy. For women only,
however, Virginia proposed a separate program, different in kind from V.M.I. and unequal in tangible and
intangible facilities....
V.W.I.L. affords women no opportunity to experience the rigorous military training for which V.M.I.
is famed. Instead, the V.W.I.L. program "de-emphasize(s)" military education and uses a "cooperative
method" of education "which reinforces self-esteem". . . .
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As earlier stated, generalizations about "the way women are," estimates of what is appropriate for most
women, no longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity place them outside the
average description. Notably, Virginia never asserted that V.M.I.'s method of education suits most men. It
is also revealing that Virginia accounted for its failure to make the V.W.I.L. experience "the entirely
militaristic experience of V.M.I." on the ground that V.W.I.L. "is planned for women who do not necessarily
expect to pursue military careers." By that reasoning, V.M.I.'s "entirely militaristic" program would be
inappropriate for men in general or as a group, for "(o)nly about 15 percent of V.M.I. cadets enter career
military service". ....
Virginia, in sum, while maintaining V.M.I. for men only, has failed to provide any "comparable
single-gender women's institution." Instead, the commonwealth has created a V.W.I.L. program fairly
appraised as a "pale shadow" of V.M.I. in terms of the range of curricular choices and faculty stature,
funding, prestige, alumni support and influence.
FROM THE DISSENT By Justice Scalia
Today the Court shuts down an institution that has served the people of the Commonwealth of Virginia
with pride and distinction for over a century and a half. To achieve that desired result, it rejects (contrary to
our established practice) the factual findings of two courts below, sweeps aside the precedents of this Court
and ignores the history of our people.
As to facts: it explicitly rejects the finding that there exist "gender-based developmental differences"
supporting Virginia's restriction of the "adversative" method to only a men's institution and the finding that
the all-male composition of the Virginia Military Institute (V.M.I.) is essential to that institution's character.
As to precedent: it drastically revises our established standards for reviewing sex-based classifications. And
as to history: it counts for nothing the long tradition, enduring down to the present, of men's military colleges
supported by both states and the Federal Government.
Much of the Court's opinion is devoted to deprecating the closed-mindedness of our forebears with
regard to women's education, and even with regard to the treatment of women in areas that have nothing to
do with education. Closed-minded they were as every age is, including our own, with regard to matters it
cannot guess, because it simply does not consider them debatable. The virtue of a democratic system with
a First Amendment is that it readily enables the people, over time, to be persuaded that what they took for
granted is not so, and to change their laws accordingly. That system is destroyed if the smug assurances of
each age are removed from the democratic process and written into the Constitution.
So to counterbalance the Court's criticism of our ancestors, let me say a word in their praise: they left
us free to change. The same cannot be said of this most illiberal Court, which has embarked on a course of
inscribing one after another of the current preferences of the society (and in some cases only the
counter-majoritarian preferences of the society's law-trained elite) into our basic law. Today it enshrines the
notion that no substantial educational value is to be served by an all-men's military academy so that the
decision by the people of Virginia to maintain such an institution denies equal protection to women who
cannot attend that institution but can attend others. Since it is entirely clear that the Constitution of the United
States -- the old one -- takes no sides in this educational debate, I dissent. ...
I have no problem with a system of abstract tests such as rational-basis, intermediate, and strict scrutiny
(though I think we can do better than applying strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny whenever we feel like
it). Such formulas are essential to evaluating whether the new restrictions that a changing society constantly
imposes upon private conduct comport with that "equal protection" our society has always accorded in the
past. But in my view the function of this Court is to preserve our society's values regarding (among other
things) equal protection, not to revise them; to prevent backsliding from the degree of restriction the
Constitution imposed upon democratic government, not to prescribe, on our own authority, progressively
higher degrees.
For that reason it is my view that, whatever abstract tests we may choose to devise, they cannot supersede
and indeed ought to be crafted so as to reflect those constant and unbroken national traditions that embody
the people's understanding of ambiguous constitutional texts. More specifically, it is my view that "when a
practice not expressly prohibited by the text of the Bill of Rights bears the endorsement of a long tradition
of open, widespread, and unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning of the Republic, we have no
proper basis for striking it down". . . .
And the rationale of today's decision is sweeping: for sex-based classifications, a redefinition of
intermediate scrutiny that makes it indistinguishable from strict scrutiny. Indeed, the Court indicates that if
any program restricted to one sex is "uniqu(e)," it must be opened to members of the opposite sex "who have
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the will and capacity" to participate in it. I suggest that the single-sex program that will not be capable of
being characterized as "unique" is not only unique but nonexistent.
In any event, regardless of whether the Court's rationale leaves some small amount of room for lawyers
to argue, it ensures that single-sex public education is fimctionally dead. The costs of litigating the
constitutionality of a single-sex education program, and the risks of ultimately losing that litigation, are
simply too high to be embraced by public officials....
Should the courts happen to interpret that vacuous phrase as establishing a standard that is not utterly
impossible of achievement, there is considerable risk that whether the standard has been met will not be
determined on the basis of the record evidence indeed, that will necessarily be the approach of any court that
seeks to walk the path the Court has trod today. No state official in his right mind will buy such a high-cost,
high-risk lawsuit by commencing a single-sex program. The enemies of single-sex education have won; by
persuading only seven Justices (five would have been enough) that their view of the world is enshrined in the
Constitution, they have effectively imposed that view on all 50 states.
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95-1100 BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSION-
ERS OF BRYAN COUNTY, OKLA. v. BROWN
Civil rights actions-Municipal liability-Official
policy-Deliberate indifference-Sheriffs hiring
decisions.
Ruling below (CA 5, 67 F.3d 1174, 57 CrL
1277):
County sheriff's decision to hire reserve deputy
sheriff without checking his criminal record
amounted to "official policy" for purposes of
municipal liability under 42 USC 1983 as inter-
preted in Monell v. New York City Department
of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); single
hiring decision also amounted to "deliberate in-
difference" to citizens' Fourth Amendment rights
for purposes of Monell liability; evidence was
sufficient for jury to conclude that sheriffs deci-
sion to hire reserve deputy was cause of injuries
unconstitutionally inflicted on plaintiff by deputy
during traffic stop; judgment for plaintiff is
affirmed.
Questions presented: (1) Does U.S. Constitu-
tion impose liability on county for single hiring
decision that comports with state law in every
respect, when there is no evidence that county's
hiring practice in past has resulted in deprivation
of citizen's constitutional rights? (2) Does hiring
of reserve deputy sheriff who has one misdemean-
or conviction for assault and battery and traffic
violations establish causative link (amounting to
deliberate indifference) between decision to hire
him and his subsequent use of force during course
of arrest? (3) Are federalism concerns implicated
by opinion that imposes liability on county for
hiring reserve deputy sheriff with one misde-
meanor assault and battery conviction and other
minor offenses, when Oklahoma proscribes only
hiring of individuals with felony records?
Petition for certiorari filed 1/5/96, by Wallace
B. Jefferson, Sharon E. Callaway, and Crofts,
Callaway & Jefferson, all of San Antonio, Texas.
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JUSTICES TO DECIDE MUNICIPAL LIABILITY ISSUE
The New York Times
Tuesday, April 23, 1996
Linda Greenhouse
Accepting a case that could revive debate over
whether local governments are responsible for
misbehavior by their employees, the Supreme Court
today agreed to hear an Oklahoma county's appeal
of a ruling that it was liable under Federal law for a
deputy sheriffs violent behavior because it had
disregarded the man's own police record and
tendency toward violence when it hired him.
The narrow question in the case is whether the
county's negligent hiring decision, an apparently
isolated act that was not part of a larger pattern and
that did not by itself violate Oklahoma law, was
sufficient to make the county legally responsible for
a woman's injuries under Federal civil rights law.
The woman, Jill Brown, was a passenger in her
husband's truck when the deputy, Stacy Burns,
stopped them after a chase across the Texas line in
1991. Mr. Burns pulled Mrs. Brown from the cab
and flung her to the pavement, injuring her knees so
severely that after four operations, she will need
total knee replacements.
A Federal District Court jury in Beaumont,
Tex., awarded her nearly $800,000, to be paid
jointly by Bryan County, Okla., and by Mr. Burns.
A Federal appeals court upheld most of the award
last year.
Federal court cases involving the excessive use
of force by police officers, or other types of
misbehavior by local officials, are hardly
uncommon. A Reconstruction-era Federal law, the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, permits suits for damages
in Federal court against those who violate federally
guaranteed statutory or constitutional rights.
In a landmark ruling in 1978, the Supreme
Court overturned an earlier decision that had
shielded local governments from liability under that
law, opening them to suit for the first time for
actions by officials that could be tied to some
official policy or custom.
In upholding the finding of liability in the
Oklahoma case, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit found that the policy at issue
was one that permitted the hiring of a
law-enforcement officer with a record of numerous
traffic violations as well as arrest for assault and
battery and for resisting arrest. "The violation of
Mrs. Brown's constitutional rights was affirmatively
linked to Bryan County's decision to hire Burns for
law-enforcement activities," the appeals court said.
What makes the case potentially noteworthy is
that the county has dressed its Supreme Court
appeal in a states'-rights rhetoric that essentially
challenges the jurisdiction of Federal courts to reach
such decisions. Oklahoma law does not bar a person
with a misdemeanor record from working in law
enforcement, the county said, arguing that by basing
liability on the hiring decision, the Fifth Circuit was
impermissibly setting its own hiring qualifications
for law-enforcement personnel.
That was "a serious blow to federalism," the
county said, adding, "Where the hiring decision is
not itself unconstitutional and no Federal law
governs the hiring decision, concepts of federalism
dictate that the State of Oklahoma's qualifying
standards for police service should control."
"This is an ideal case for this Court to
demonstrate how federalism affects a Federal court's
review of municipal liability," the county said.
Now that the Supreme Court has agreed to hear
the case, Bryan County Board of Commissioners v.
Brown, No. 95-1100, the question is whether the
Justices will accept the county's invitation for a
broad review of municipal liability for Federal civil
rights violations.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, as an
Associate Justice, was one of two dissenters from
the 1978 decision, Monell v. New York City
Department of Social Services, that opened local
governments to suit under the civil rights law. He,
along with Warren E. Burger, then the Chief Justice,
warned that the decision would have unfortunate
consequences. The earlier decision that had provided
immunity to local governments "protected
municipalities and their limited treasuries from the
consequences of their officials' failure to predict the
course of this Court's constitutional jurisprudence,"
Justice Rehnquist said in his dissenting opinion in
1978.
While there is essentially no chance that the
Court would return to the days of complete
municipal immunity, the Justices are in the middle
of revisiting many aspects of the federalism question
and may well give Bryan County's arguments a
sympathetic hearing.
The case could, for example, produce a ruling
that sets a stricter definition of the policy or custom
that needs to be linked to the constitutional
violation. The Court might disavow suggestions in
some of its rulings during the 1980's that a single
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incident, as occurred in this case, could be sufficient
to establish liability, and could instead insist -- as
Bryan County is arguing -- that a pattern of
violations must be shown.
In another action today, the Court agreed to
decide whether a central protection embodied in
another Federal civil rights act, which bars
employment discrimination, extends to former as
well as current employees.
That law is Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. A provision of the law makes it illegal for an
employer to retaliate against "employees or
applicants for employment" for having brought a
complaint of employment discrimination.
The Court today accepted an appeal by a man
who filed a complaint of racial discrimination under
Tide VII after his employer, the Shell Oil Company,
dismissed him in 1991. The next year, after a former
supervisor at Shell gave him an unfavorable
reference for a job with another company, the man,
Charles T. Robinson Sr., filed a second Title VII
complaint against Shell, saying the unfavorable
reference amounted to retaliation.
The Federal District Court in Baltimore
dismissed the retaliation complaint on the ground
that only current employees or applicants for
employment were protected by that section of the
law. After a three-judge panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in
Richmond, overturned that decision, the full appeals
court reinstated it last November, 7 to 5.
In his appeal, Robinson v. Shell Oil, No.
95-1376, Mr. Robinson, who is black, is arguing
that excluding former employees from the
no-retaliation provision "leads to grossly absurd
results."
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Jill BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,
V.
BRYAN COUNTY, OK, et al., Defendants,
Bryan County, OK and Stacy Burns, Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees
United States Court of Appeals,Fifth Circuit.
67 F.3d 1174
Oct. 23, 1995
... REYNALDO G. GARZA, Circuit Judge:
SUBSTITUTE PANEL OPINION
A claim for damages was brought against Reserve Deputy Stacy Burns (Burns) and Bryan County,
Oklahoma (Bryan County), by Jill Brown (Mrs. Brown) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Oklahoma law.
The case proceeded to trial, in which the jury found in favor of the Plaintiff on every interrogatory submitted.
The district court entered a judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict with one exception: Mrs. Brown
was not allowed to recover for loss of past income or future earning capacity. Burns and Bryan County
(collectively the "Appellants") appeal the judgment against them while Mrs. Brown appeals the portion of
the judgment that denied her recovery for lost past income and future earning capacity. For the reasons stated
below we affirm the district court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
In the early hours of May 12, 1991, Todd Brown (Mr. Brown) and Mrs. Brown were traveling from
Grayson County, Texas, to their home in Bryan County, Oklahoma. After crossing into Oklahoma, Mr.
Brown, who was driving, noticed a police checkpoint. He decided to avoid the checkpoint and headed back
to Texas, allegedly to spend the night at his mother's house. Although the parties offer conflicting stories
leading to the pursuit, Deputy Sheriff Robert Morrison (Deputy Morrison) and Burns stated that they
"chased" the Browns' vehicle at a high rate of speed before successfully pulling it over. Mr. Brown testified
that he was oblivious to the deputies' attempts to overtake him until both vehicles had traveled approximately
three miles. By the time the two vehicles eventually stopped, the parties had crossed into Grayson County,
Texas, four miles from the Oklahoma checkpoint.
Immediately after exiting the squad car, Deputy Morrison unholstered his weapon, pointed it toward the
Browns' vehicle and ordered the occupants to raise their hands. Burns, who was unarmed, rounded the corner
of the truck to the passenger's side. After twice ordering Mrs. Brown from the vehicle, Burns pulled her from
the seat of the cab and threw her to the ground. Burns employed an "arm bar" technique whereby he grabbed
Mrs. Brown's arm at the wrist and elbow, extracted her from the vehicle and spun her to the ground. Mrs.
Brown's impact with the ground caused severe injury to her knees, requiring corrective surgery. While Mrs.
Brown was pinned to the ground, Burns handcuffed her and left to assist Deputy Morrison in subduing her
husband. Mrs. Brown remained handcuffed anywhere from a minimum of thirty minutes to just over an hour.
According to Mrs. Brown's version of the facts, which will be reviewed in greater detail below, the
deputies' pursuit and the force consequently applied against her were unprovoked. Furthermore, she claims
that her detention constituted false imprisonment and false arrest. Due to the injuries resulting from that
encounter, Mrs. Brown seeks compensation from Burns and Bryan County. Mrs. Brown premised the
county's liability, inter alia, on the hiring of Burns by Sheriff B.J. Moore (Sheriff Moore), the county
policymaker for the Sheriffs Department.
DISCUSSION
The Appellants have presented this Court with a host of issues to support their position that the lower
court erred. For efficiency's sake, we will address only those points that we believe merit review. We first
address the claims against Burns for the constitutional injuries that Brown suffered.
I.
In their first argument, Burns and Bryan County allege that the force applied against Mrs. Brown was
proper. Appellants claim that the evidence "undisputedly" established that Burns' actions on the morning
of May 12, 1991, were objectively reasonable. Therefore, the jury's findings should be reversed.
All claims that a law enforcement officer has used excessive force--deadly or not-in the course of an
arrest, investigatory stop, or other "seizure" of a free citizen, are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and
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its "reasonableness" standard. The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment requires careful
attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. The "reasonableness" of the particular force
used must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, rather than with the 20/20
vision of hindsight. In cases implicating excessive force, "not every push or shove, even if it may later seem
unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers," violates the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the question is
whether the officer's actions are "objectively reasonable" in light of the facts and circumstances confronting
him, without regard to his underlying intent or motivation.
Determining whether Burns' actions were reasonable depends on whose story the trier of fact accepts as
true. According to the testimony of Burns and Deputy Morrison, they were involved in a "high-speed"
pursuit after the Browns abruptly turned their truck and sped from the checkpoint. After a four mile "chase"
both vehicles came to a full stop. The deputies exited their vehicle and made several commands for the
occupants to raise their hands before those commands were obeyed. After rounding the truck, Burns twice
ordered Mrs. Brown to exit the vehicle, but she did not comply. He then perceived that she was "lean[ing]
forward" in the cab of the truck as if she were "grabbing a gun." He was "scared to death," so he extracted
her from the vehicle. He spun her around, dropped her to the ground via the arm bar maneuver and
handcuffed her. That was the lowest amount of force he deemed necessary to extract her and ensure he and
his partner's safety.
Certainly, Appellants' version of the facts supports a claim that Burns acted reasonably and with an
appropriate amount of force. The Browns, however, paint a strikingly different picture. They testified that
they were oblivious to the attempts made by the deputies to catch up to them (the Browns) after avoiding the
Oklahoma checkpoint. Mr. Brown avoided that stop because he feared the possibility of being harassed or
unnecessarily detained by the deputies. He further testified that he did not believe that he turned the truck
around either in a reckless fashion nor with wheels squealing or throwing gravel, and that he drove away at
a normal rate of speed. Finally realizing that they were being pursued, Mr. Brown pulled over only to find
a gun pointed at him. They were ordered to put their hands up and they did so.
Mrs. Brown then testified that Burns ran to her side of the vehicle and ordered her to get out. She was
paralyzed with fear and heard Bums repeat the command. According to her testimony, however, she was not
slow in responding to Bums' orders and she did not make any sudden moves while exiting the vehicle. Her
only forward movement was to exit the truck and, contrary to Burns' testimony, she did not reach for
anything. Then, while she was exiting the truck, Burns suddenly grabbed her arm, yanked her out, spun her
around and threw her to the pavement. She could not break her fall because one arm was raised and Burns
firmly gripped the other.
In addition to this conflicting testimony, both sides elicited expert testimony concerning the
reasonableness of Burns' actions. Mrs. Brown's expert, for example, concluded that the force applied by
Burns in this situation was unjustified and excessive. The jury weighed all the evidence, evaluated the
conflicting testimony and rendered a verdict in Mrs. Brown's favor. Under our standard of review, when the
evidence supports the verdict, this Court will not impose its own opinion in contravention to the jury's.
Therefore, we will not interfere with the fact finder's conclusion that Burns' actions were unreasonable and
that the force he used was excessive.
II.
Notwithstanding the jury's findings, Appellants also assert that there was probable cause to arrest Mrs.
Brown. They argue that the facts justified Burn's actions, thereby precluding Mrs. Brown's § 1983 claim for
false arrest.
There is no cause of action for false arrest under § 1983 unless the arresting officer lacked probable
cause. To determine the presence or absence of probable cause, one must consider the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the arrest. Whether officers have probable cause depends on whether, at the time
of the arrest, the " 'facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that [the arrested] had
committed or was committing an offense.'"
Furthermore, although flight alone will not provide probable cause that a crime is being committed, in
appropriate circumstances it may supply the" 'key ingredient justifying the decision of a law enforcement
officer to take action."'
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To reiterate, whether Burns had probable cause to arrest Mrs. Brown depends in large part on whether
the facts, as Bums knew them, were sufficient to warrant a prudent man's belief that Mrs. Brown committed
or was in the process of committing a crime. The facts material to that determination were hotly contested,
especially the contradictory testimony relating to the pursuit and Mrs. Brown's movements while exiting the
vehicle. Thus, it was for the fact finder to determine whether Burns had probable cause to arrest Mrs. Brown.
Assuming arguendo that the deputies had a reasonable suspicion to perform an investigatory stop, we
nevertheless find the evidence sufficient to support the jury's finding that Burns did not have probable cause
to arrest Mrs. Brown, and that his doing so violated her constitutional right to be free from false arrest.
As the jury found that Burns did not have probable cause to detain or arrest Mrs. Brown, it could also
find from the evidence that she was falsely imprisoned. To set out a claim for false imprisonment the
plaintiff must prove (1) an intent to confine, (2) acts resulting in confinement, and (3) consciousness of the
victim of confinement or resulting harm. Under § 1983, the plaintiff must also prove the deprivation of a
constitutional right, i.e., an illegality under color of state law. The evidence establishes that Mrs. Brown
believed herself to be under arrest: even though she had committed no crime, she remained handcuffed for
approximately an hour before being released, during which time she was never informed of the nature of the
charges for which she was being detained, and subsequently no charges were ever brought. In light of such
evidence, a finding of false imprisonment is proper.
inl.
Appellants also contest the jury's finding that Burns was not entitled to qualified immunity. A proper
analysis of a qualified immunity defense requires us to conduct a two (sometimes three) prong inquiry. First,
we determine "whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all." Second, we
establish whether the law was clearly established at the time of the official's action. Third, we evaluate the
"objective reasonableness of [the] official's conduct as measured by reference to clearly established law."
It is clear that by 1991, use of excessive force, false arrest and false imprisonment had been held to violate
citizens' constitutional rights, thus the qualified immunity defense fails if Burns did not act with probable
cause. And as the trier of fact determined that Burns did not have probable cause to arrest Mrs. Burns, he
is not entitled to qualified immunity.
IV.
Bums asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's award of punitive damages. He argues
that application of the arm bar technique did not rise to a level of "flagrant" conduct and further, that it did
not evidence malice or give rise to an inference of evil intent. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has ruled that
punitive damages are recoverable in a § 1983 action. One of the primary reasons for § 1983 actions and
punitive damages is to deter future egregious conduct. A jury may assess punitive damages in an action
under § 1983 if the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or involved
reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others. The question is whether the acts
of Burns, which caused the deprivation of Mrs. Brown's constitutional rights, rose to a level warranting the
imposition of punitive damages. In light of the evidence before it, we believe that the jury could properly
infer that Burns' acts were unjustified and that he acted with callous or reckless indifference to Mrs. Brown's
constitutional rights. Therefore, punitive damages were justified.
V.
On cross-appeal, Mrs. Brown argues that it was error for the district court to grant Appellants' Motion
for Judgment Notwithstanding the Jury Verdict (JNOV) as it relates to her claims for loss of past income and
future earning capacity. Mrs. Brown asserts that neither Bryan County nor Burns specifically raised an issue
concerning the sufficiency of the evidence supporting that portion of the judgment, thus the district court's
action was unjustified and the award must be reinstated. She insists that there is absolutely no legal predicate
on which the district court could base its actions. Therefore, as evidence was offered to support this award,
Mrs. Brown argues that the original jury award should be reinstated.
This Court has determined that it "would be a constitutionally impermissible re-examination of the jury's
verdict for the district court [or this Court] to enter judgment n.o.v. on a ground not raised in the motion for
directed verdict." It is undisputed that the Appellants did not address the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jury's award for loss of past income and future earning capacity in their motions for either
directed verdict or JNOV. Thus, the lower court should not have decided whether sufficient evidence exists
to support this award. However, as the Appellants point out, Mrs. Brown failed to object to this error at trial,
and it is the "unwavering rule in this Circuit that issues raised for the first time on appeal are reviewed only
for plain error." In other words, this Court will reverse only if the error complained of results in a "manifest
miscarriage of justice." Furthermore, contrary to Mrs. Brown's contention, the issue is not whether any
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evidence exists to support the jury verdict. Instead, the issue is whether the district court's action constituted
plain error.
Upon reviewing the record, we do not believe that the lower court's error resulted in a manifest
miscarriage of justice. The only evidence offered in support of the award comprised of Mrs. Brown's
testimony, which reflected that she had accepted an offer to commence work a few days after the day of the
incident. Her compensation would have been measured on a commission basis, which she believed would
have paid between $1,500 to $1,800 a month. The district court's ruling that this evidence was lacking does
not arise to plain error. Mrs. Brown's failure to object at the appropriate time denied the district court the
opportunity to rectify any errors. Therefore, the court's ruling will stand.
VI.
Having found that Bums violated Mrs. Brown's constitutional rights, the next inquiry concerns the
possible liability of Bryan County. Liability will accrue for the acts of a municipal official when the official
possesses "final policymaking authority" to establish municipal policy with respect to the conduct that
resulted in a violation of constitutional rights.
Bryan County stipulated that Sheriff Moore was the final policymaker for the Sheriffs Department. As
such, it is patently clear that Sheriff Moore is an official "whose acts or edicts may fairly be said to represent
official policy and whose decisions therefore may give rise to municipal liability under § 1983."
Mrs. Brown argues that a municipality can be held liable under § 1983 based on a final policymaker's
single decision regarding the hiring or training of one individual. Appellants, on the other hand, argue that§ 1983 liability cannot attach on the basis of a policymaker's single, isolated decision to hire or train one
individual.
An argument similar to the Appellants' was rejected by this Court in Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist.
In Gonzalez, the Ysleta Independent School District (YISD) was sued for a single decision to transfer a
teacher accused of sexually harassing a student, rather than removing him from the classroom. YISD argued
that this ad hoc, isolated decision, even when made by policymakers, did not constitute the sort of "policy"
upon which municipal liability could be predicated under Monell. This was especially true there, insisted
YISD, as the decision was contrary to the district's own formal policy for handling such matters. This
argument proved unpersuasive.
Based on the facts before it, the Gonzalez panel concluded that the final policymaker's single, conscious
decision, i.e., the Board of Trustee's decision to transfer the teacher rather than remove him from the
classroom, constituted a "policy" attributable to the school district. This conclusion was logical, as "[n]o one
has ever doubted ... that a municipality may be liable under § 1983 for a single decision by its properly
constituted legislative body ... because even a single decision by such a body unquestionably constitutes an
act of official government policy." To deny compensation to the victim in such a case would be contrary to
the fundamental purpose of § 1983. So, it is clear that a single decision may create municipal liability if that
decision were made by a final policymaker responsible for that activity.
Mrs. Brown argues that Burns' lengthy criminal history should have prevented Sheriff Moore from hiring
him. Burns' history revealed a string of offenses that, she claims, demonstrates a disregard for the law and
a propensity for violence. Moreover, she maintains that a thorough investigation of Burns' background would
have revealed that his parole had been violated by his numerous offenses. Thus, she argues that Burns'
screening and subsequent employment by Sheriff Moore were inadequate and subjected Bryan County to
liability.
During the application process Sheriff Moore ordered a printout of Burns' criminal record, which
revealed the following citations and arrests: nine moving traffic violations, Actual Physical Control (APC)
of a motor vehicle while intoxicated, driving with a suspended license, arrest for assault and battery,
conviction for possession of a false identification and an arrest for resisting lawful arrest....
We believe that the evidence supports the jury's conclusion that Sheriff Moore did not conduct a good
faith investigation of Burns. Although it is true that Sheriff Moore ran a NCIC check of Burns, this action
was futile given that Burns' arrest history was all but ignored. Sheriff Moore conceded that Burns' record
was so long that he did not bother to examine it. And, except for this feeble attempt to screen him, no other
effort was made to investigate Burns. A further examination would have revealed that Burns had repeatedly
violated probation, and that a warrant was subsequently issued for his arrest. In light of this history, it should
have been obvious to Sheriff Moore that a further investigation of Burns was necessary.
We also find the evidence sufficient for a jury to conclude that Sheriff Moore's decision to hire Burns
amounted to deliberate indifference to the public's welfare. In light of the law enforcement duties assigned
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to deputies, the obvious need for a thorough and good faith investigation of Burns, and the equally obvious
fact that inadequate screening of a deputy could likely result in the violation of citizens' constitutional rights,
Sheriff Moore can reasonably be said to have acted with deliberate indifference to the public's welfare when
he hired Burns. The failure to conduct a good faith investigation of the prospective employee amounted to
Sheriff Moore deliberately closing his eyes to the Burns' background. Such indifferent behavior cannot be
tolerated when the prospective applicant will be employed in a position of trust and authority.
Additionally, the jury could find that hiring an unqualified applicant and authorizing him to make forcible
arrests actually caused the injuries suffered by Mrs. Brown. That is, the policymaker's (Sheriff Moore's)
single action of hiring Burns without an adequate review of his background directly caused the constitutional
violations of which Mrs. Brown now complains. Therefore, the violation of Mrs. Brown's constitutional
rights was affirmatively linked to Bryan County's decision to hire Burns for law enforcement activities.
CONCLUSION
After a thorough review of the record, this Court finds that the evidence supports the jury's verdict
holding Burns and Bryan County liable for Mrs. Brown's § 1983 claim based on her false arrest, false
imprisonment and the inadequate hiring of Burns. We also find that the district court did not plainly err in
dismissing the jury's award for Mrs. Brown's loss of past income and future earning capacity. For these
reasons, the jury's verdict stands and the district court's judgment is
AFFIRMED.
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: [OMITTED]
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95-1376 ROBINSON v. SHELL OIL CO.
Anti-retaliation provision of Title VII-Definition
of employee-Former employee.
Ruling below (CA 4, 70 F.3d 325, 64 LW
2356, 69 FEP Cases 522):
Former employees are not "employees" within
meaning of anti-retaliation provision of Title VII
of 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Question presented: Does term "employees" in
Section 704(a) of 1964 Civil Rights Act, making
it unlawful for employer to discriminate against
any of its employees or applicants for employ-
ment because they have availed themselves of
Title VII's protections, include former
employees?
Petition for certiorari filed 2/27/96. by Allen
M. Lenchek, of Rockville, Md.
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COURT TO RULE ON WORKERS' SHIELD FROM EX-EMPLOYERS
Md. Man Says Company Punished Him for Filing Bias Charges over Firing
The Baltimore Sun
Tuesday, April 23, 1996
Lyle Denniston
WASHINGTON -- The Supreme Court agreed
yesterday to decide if a worker fired from one job
allegedly because of race has a right to seek new
work without his former bosses retaliating by
interfering with his search. A Maryland man,
Charles T. Robinson Sr., persuaded the court to
consider whether he is covered by a federal law that
protects workers from retaliation after they have
accused their companies of illegal discrimination in
the workplace.
That law is designed to assure workers not only
that they can pursue claims of bias, but also that,
once they do, their employers cannot make them
suffer for having exercised their rights. A dispute
has arisen among federal appeals courts around the
nation, however, on whether that law covers a
company's former employees, as well as its current
employees.
The 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in
Richmond, Va., ruled in November that once Mr.
Robinson was no longer employed by Shell Oil Co.,
he could not challenge under civil rights law
anything that Shell may have done after their
relationship came to an end.
A total of nine U.S. appeals courts have now
ruled on that issue; one of them agrees with the
Richmond court, while seven others disagreed and
have assured workers that leaving a job does not cut
off their rights to claim that their former employer
retaliated.
Mr. Robinson, who now lives in a Maryland
suburb of Washington, was a sales representative
for Shell when he was fired more than four years
ago. He contended that he was discharged because
of his race; he is black. His race bias complaint
failed in federal court in Baltimore. While that court
case went ahead, Mr. Robinson applied for a job at
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. That company
contacted Shell and got back a negative report on
him: Shell said that he had been fired, that Shell
would not rehire him, that his job performance was
below average and that he had a poor job attendance
record.
Mr. Robinson was then denied a job at the
insurance company. Yesterday, his attorney, Allen
M. Lencheck of Rockville, said that Mr. Robinson
later got ajob with Metropolitan Life, but has since
left that position and now works for another
company.
- After Shell gave its negative report on him, Mr.
Robinson went back into federal court, claiming that
Shell was retaliating for his earlier claim of bias. At
Shell's request, the new case was thrown out when
the judge concluded that the law does not apply to
former employees. The Supreme Court will hear
arguments on the case next fall and issue a final
decision about a year from now.
CIVIL RIGHTS CASE
In another civil rights case, the court agreed
yesterday to spell out what kind of hiring decisions
may make a county or city government legally
responsible for the acts of an employee who violates
someone's rights.
A deputy sheriff hired by his uncle, an
Oklahoma county sheriff, despite a lengthy criminal
record of convictions and arrests was found to have
used excessive force when he pulled a woman out of
her car and threw her to the ground, injuring her
knees. He said the woman was refusing to obey his
orders to get out of the car after a high-speed chase.
The county also has been held responsible for
the deputy's actions on the theory that the sheriff
should have investigated his background before
hiring him and should not have hired him at all. The
county contends in an appeal that a single hiring
decision by a county official should not be enough to
blame the county for the misdeeds of a worker it
hires.
OTHER ACTIONS
In another action, the court refused to review the
constitutionality of an Oklahoma City ordinance that
makes it a crime for one person to solicit another
person in public to engage in sex. That law was used
to prosecute a gay man for inviting a plainclothes
police officer in a park to engage in a homosexual
act.
The court also turned aside, without comment,
a plea by the Federal Communications Commission
to clarify its power to enforce the federal law that
bars radio and television stations from overcharging
political candidates for airing their campaign
advertisements. A lower court has questioned the
FCC's power to be the sole authority to monitor
charges for political ads.
The Baltimore Sun Copyright 1996
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COURT WILL REVIEW 'EMPLOYER' DEFINITION
U.P.I.
Monday, March 8, 1996
Michael Kirkland
The Supreme Court agreed Monday to review a Chicago case and the
conditions under which a small business can escape discrimination suits. In the
case involving alleged sex discrimination, a lower court has rejected the method
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission uses to count employees to
determine if a business is large enough to come under civil rights law. The
Supreme Court accepted the case without comment. Argument probably will be
heard next winter. Crucial to the case is how federal civil rights law is interpreted.
Title VII of the the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which deals with discrimination,
applies to an employer who "has 15 or more employees for each working day in
each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year."
Darlene Walters was employed as a payment collector by Metropolitan
Educational Enterprises Inc., an encyclopedia and educational materials sales
company. When she was denied promotion to credit manager in 1989, Walters
filed a gender discrimination suit under the Civil Rights Act. When she was fired
in 1990, she filed a retaliation suit against the company. The EEOC joined the
retaliation case in 1993. For the purposes of the Civil Rights Act, the EEOC
counts as "employees" all workers who are on employer's payroll for a particular
working day. But the federal judge accepted Metropolitan's argument that, for
the purposes of the act, workers should be counted as hourly paid "employees"
only if they are physically at work or on paid leave for a particular day. Since
under that definition Metropolitan did not have enough employees for the
20-week period to be governed by the Civil Rights Act, the judge dismissed the
case. After an unsuccessful appeal, Walters and the EEOC asked the Supreme
Court in separate petitions to review the case. The court consolidated the cases
Monday when it granted review. (No. 95-259, Walters vs. Metropolitan
Education Enterprises et al; and No. 95-779, EEOC vs. Metropolitan etc)
UP.I Copyright 1996
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Charles T. ROBINSON, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant,
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Amicus Curiae,
V.
SHELL OIL COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
70 F.3d 325
Nov. 29, 1995
... HAMILTON, Circuit Judge:
Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (commonly referred to as Title VII's
anti-retaliation provision) makes it unlawful "for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees
or applicants for employment" who have either availed themselves of Title VII's protections or assisted others
in so doing. Subsection 2000e(f) of Title VII defines "employee" as "an individual employed by an
employer." The issue before the en banc court is whether the term "employees" includes former employees.
We conclude that it does not.
I.
Shell Oil Company (Shell) terminated Charles T. Robinson (Robinson) from its employment in 1991.
Shortly thereafter, Robinson filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
alleging that Shell had terminated him because of his race. While that charge was pending, Robinson applied
for a job with another company that contacted Shell, as Robinson's former employer, for an employment
reference. According to Robinson, Shell gave him a negative reference. Robinson attributed the negative
reference to Shell's intention to retaliate against him for filing the EEOC charge.
Robinson subsequently filed this action. Robinson's complaint alleged that after he filed a charge of race
discrimination against Shell with the EEOC, Shell provided "false information and negative job references
to perspective [sic] employers." The complaint further alleged that such action violated the anti-retaliation
provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Contending the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII does not provide former employees a cause of
action against their former employers for post-employment retaliation, Shell moved to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In support of its motion, Shell
cited Polsby v. Chase which held that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII does not apply to former
employees. Upon Shell's motion, the district court dismissed the complaint. Subsequently, the Supreme
Court summarily vacated Polsby.
Robinson appealed to this court. A divided panel of this court reversed the judgment of the district court,
but, on Shell's suggestion, we vacated the panel decision and reheard the case en banc. We now affirm.
Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in pertinent part: (a) It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants
for employment ... because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. In reviewing the propriety of the district court's
dismissal of Robinson's complaint, our task is to apply Title VII's anti-retaliation provision to the facts before
us. The dispute regarding the correct application centers on the scope of the term "employees." Robinson
asserts the term "employees" includes former, as well as current, employees. According to Robinson, this
interpretation is favorable because it gives effect to the remedial purpose of Title VII to eradicate illegal
discrimination in the work place. Conversely, relying on the plain language of the statute, Shell asserts that
the term "employees" includes only current employees....
In deciding whether Title VII's anti-retaliation provision provides a former employee a cause of action
against his former employer for post-employment retaliation, we find the statutory language unambiguously
answers the question "no." First, we look at the language Congress used: "It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment ... because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." Subsection 2000e(f) defines "employee" for
purposes of all provisions of Title VII as "an individual employed by an employer." Read in pari materia,
these sections of Title VII provide a remedy for acts of retaliation to employees and applicants for
employment who have either availed themselves of Title VII's protections or assisted others in so doing.
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Although subsection 2000e(f) defines the term "employee" as "an individual employed by an employer,"
Robinson contends, rather remarkably, that the term "employees" as used in Title VII's anti-retaliation
provision means "former employees." His contention is legally untenable. Title VII defines "employee" for
purposes of all provisions of Title VII; thus, that definition controls the meaning of "employee" wherever
it appears throughout the statute. Because Title VII does not define "employee" as an individual no longer
employed by an employer, then, under the rules of statutory construction, that meaning is excluded as a
meaning from the term "employee." We are simply prohibited from reading into the clear language of the
definition of "employee" that which Congress did not include. If Congress intended Title VII to remedy
discrimination beyond the employment relationship, then it could have easily done so by including "former
employee" when defining the term "employee."
Neither is the language comprising Title VIrs definition of the term "employee" ("an individual employed
by an employer'), ambiguous. The rules of statutory construction require us to give the words Congress used
to define "employee" their common usage. The term "employed" as used in subsection 2000e(f) is commonly
used to mean "performing work under an employer-employee relationship." Certainly, the term "employed"
is not commonly used to mean "no longer performing work under an employer-employee relationship."
Furthermore, "employer" as used in subsection 2000e(f) is commonly used to mean "one who employs the
services of others." Again, no meaningful argument can be made that the term "employer" is commonly used
to mean "one who no longer employs the services of others." Accordingly, we reject any notion that the
language in Title VII's definition of the term "employee" is ambiguous.
Because the language in Title VII's definition of "employee" is not ambiguous, any attempt to resort to
legislative history is foreclosed. Therefore, this court is bound to apply literally the term "employees" in Title
VII's anti-retaliation provision as defined by Congress in subsection 2000e(f) without examination of any
other sources of legislative intent, unless such application falls within one of the exceptions to literal
application.
Here, neither exception applies because both require Congress to have made plain that it intended a result
different than literal application would produce. Indeed, the absence of any language in Title VII's
anti-retaliation provision referring to former employees is strong evidence that Congress did not intend Title
VII to protect former employees. Additionally, Congress' inclusion of "applicants for employment" as
persons distinct from "employees," coupled with its failure to likewise include "former employees," is strong
evidence of Congressional intent that the term "employees" in Title VII's anti- retaliation provision does not
include former employees. With no applicable exception to prevent literal application of the words Congress
chose, we hold, as we must, that the meaning of the term "employees" in Title VII's anti- retaliation provision
does not include former employees as urged by Robinson. Because "former employees" are not included in
the statutory language, Title VII's anti-retaliation provision does not protect them. Given that the statute does
not protect former employees, Robinson has no claim under its aegis.
We are not unmindful that our holding is embraced by only one circuit court and at odds with the
majority of circuit courts that have addressed this question. In concluding that Title VII's anti-retaliation
provision and other parallel statutes reach post-employment retaliation, the decisions in the majority have
interpreted the term "employee" broadly to " 'include[ ] a former employee as long as the alleged
discrimination is related to or arises out of the employment relationship.' " Essentially, the rationale
supporting this interpretation is that a literal application of the term "employees" produces a result that would
defeat the underlying policies of Title VII to eradicate discrimination in the work place. For example, in
Charlton, the court opined that "post-employment blacklisting is sometimes more damaging than on- the-job
discrimination because an employee subject to discrimination on the job will often continue to receive a
paycheck while a former employee subject to retaliation may be prevented from obtaining any work in the
trade or occupation previously pursued."
The rationale of these decisions totally disregards, without explanation, the established analytical
framework for statutory construction. Instead, they rely on broad considerations of policy. Most divine what
they posit as Congress' intent from the reach of Title VII. None of these decisions directly address the
absence of Congressional expression on this issue. These decisions are, therefore, at odds with the
well-settled rule that in the absence of expressed Congressional intent, courts must assume that Congress
intended to convey the language's ordinary meaning. Indeed, these decisions fail to heed the Supreme Court's
repeated mandate: "We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a
statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are
unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: 'judicial inquiry is complete.' " Furthermore, these
decisions of our sister circuits disregard Title VI's definition of "employee" as the definitive source for
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determining the meaning of the term "employees" as used in Title VII's anti-retaliation provision. In short,
we are completely unpersuaded by their analyses, which depend for their substance on broad policy
arguments which are simply not supported by the plain language of Title VII.
III.
Although extending Title VII to cover former employees is tantalizing fruit, our judicial inquiry must
cease when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous. Such is the rule of law. In no uncertain
terms, Congress, for whatever reason, has chosen, through the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, to
protect "employees," i.e., "individual[s] employed by an employer," and "applicants for employment," but
not to protect former employees. Because Robinson's complaint alleges post-employment retaliation, the
district court properly dismissed his complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly,
we affirm.
K.K. HALL, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Imagine that on Friday, the first day of the month, XYZ Corporation decides to terminate two of its line
workers, Smith and Jones, and immediately gives them two weeks' written notice. Smith and Jones, each
believing that she has been unlawfully discriminated against, file charges with the EEOC on Monday the
fourth. Unable, however, to afford the luxury of undue optimism, both Smith and Jones explore the
possibility of signing on with XYZ's competitor, LMNOP, Inc.
On Tuesday the twelfth, XYZ's personnel department receives a letter from its LMNOP counterpart,
requesting employment information and references on Smith and Jones. Annoyed that the pair have filed
EEOC charges against the company, XYZ's personnel director intentionally and vindictively prepares false
reports for dissemination to LMNOP. The spurious reports are placed in separate envelopes and stamped
for mailing on Friday the fifteenth, which also happens to be Smith and Jones's last day at XYZ. Although
Smith's report is included in Friday's outgoing mail, Jones's report is inadvertently excluded, and, therefore,
not sent to LMNOP until Monday the eighteenth.
The majority cannot dispute that XYZ's conduct toward Smith and Jones was equally culpable, and that
the company's behavior was precisely that which Title VII's anti-retaliation provision was designed to
prohibit. Nevertheless, under the approach adopted today by the majority--an approach in diametric
opposition to that employed by the vast preponderance of our sister circuits and by the EEOC itself--Smith
would be entitled to file a retaliation charge, and Jones would be left out in the cold. Because the majority's
decision will soon create many more Joneses than Smiths, I must respectfully dissent.
I.
A.
The majority acknowledges that, even if the term "employees" as used in Section 704(a) unambiguously
designates only those persons earning a paycheck from the offending employer at the moment of retaliation,
this court may nevertheless expand the scope of the designation to avoid a grossly absurd or plainly
unintended result. As illustrated by the XYZ hypothetical, the majority's construction of Section 704(a) will
inevitably lead to grossly absurd results; that those results are also plainly unintended can be readily
understood by examining Congress's purpose in enacting Title VII.
B.
"In determining the meaning of [a] statute, we look not only to the particular statutory language, but to
the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy." The statutory scheme in this case is Title
VII, and Congress's purpose in enacting it is easily discerned.
Title VII is sweeping, remedial legislation; it applies to virtually all entities that affect the employment
relationship, and it proscribes a vast range of ignoble behavior. There is a detailed enforcement procedure--
including resort to the federal courts, which are accorded broad power to grant legal and equitable relief.
Congress demonstrated, by giving Title VII a broad reach, that it is serious about eradicating discrimination
and its invidious effects within the employment relationship. That is why the statute was enacted, and that
is why the anti-retaliation provision was included, Congress understood that Title VII could only be enforced
effectively if the persons most aggrieved by discriminatory practices could come forward without fear of
retribution. Unfortunately, the majoritys construction of the term "employees" in Section 704(a) will actively
hinder the enforcement mechanism.
This hindrance will work on two levels. There is, of course, the obvious hindrance of allowing an
employer to escape sanctions for behavior that is clearly unlawful. More subtle, however, is the hindrance
on enforcement that will almost certainly result from the remaining employees' reluctance to bring subsequent
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violations to the EEOC's attention; no reasonable employee will come forward if there is any chance that his
or her term of employment will soon end, thus giving the employer carte blanche to retaliate. Moreover, an
aggrieved person should not be forced to remain with an abusive employer solely to ensure that he or she
receives the full protection of Title VII.
C.
Today's decision erodes a crucial Title VII enforcement mechanism; it thus will inevitably erode the
substantive protections of Title VII itself. Because Congress's inclusion of Section 704(a) was intended to
strengthen-not weaken- the statute, I would interpret the section's language in a manner consistent with that
intent.
My interpretation of Section 704(a) hardly brands me a maverick; indeed, the majority's approach is the
eccentric one. No fewer than six courts of appeal have concluded, as I do, that the section's protection
extends to those employees no longer actively engaged in working for the retaliating employer. Until now,
the Seventh Circuit had stood alone in reaching the opposite conclusion. Moreover, the EEOC itself has
appeared before this court, as amicus curiae, to urge that we adopt the dominant rule fashioned by our sister
circuits.
Two of those courts have explicitly concluded that the primary focus in determining whether a plaintiff
states a claim under Section 704(a) should be on whether the alleged retaliation either arose from the
employment relationship or was related to the employment. I wholeheartedly agree. By choosing instead to
focus exclusively on the time when the employee was actively working, the majority has framed its inquiry
much too narrowly; such a myopic approach only frustrates Congress's attempt, through Title VII, to
eradicate workplace discrimination.
II.
To this point, I have accepted, for the purposes of argument, the majority's contention that the term
"employees," as used in Section 704(a), is unambiguous. I have argued that the result arrived at by the
majority is nevertheless grossly absurd and so clearly contrary to Congressional intent as to justify expanding
the asserted ordinary meaning of the term to embrace, if necessary, an extraordinary meaning.
In actuality, my burden is not as difficult as the majority purports it to be. If it were, it is unlikely that
six other courts of appeal, comprised of judges who are doubtlessly familiar with the canons of statutory
construction, would have all arrived at a conclusion that the majority of this court apparently finds so
bewildering.
I believe it likely that our sister circuits have, at least implicitly, grounded their decisions on a premise
that I find inescapable--that the term "employees" is ambiguous. Indeed, under the statute's tautological
definition of the term as "individual[s] employed by an employer," one could no more comprehend what an
employee is than one could ascertain the legal essence of the term designee, if defined merely as an
"individual designated by a designator." To comprehend the meaning of employee (or designee), one must
first understand what it means to employ (or to designate). The root "employ," of course, may mean many
different things, even within the business/labor context; though it is often used to describe the current
contractual relationship between a company and a designated worker, that is not its exclusive meaning.
Where the use of a term in a particular context admits of more than one meaning, that term is, ipso facto,
ambiguous.
inl.
Because the term "employees," as used in Section 704(a) is ambiguous, it is our duty to construe its
meaning. I choose to interpret the term consistently with what I perceive to be the clear intent of Congress
to effectively remedy the problem of discrimination in employment--a problem that today's decision will not
assist in solving.
MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting: [OMITTED]
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95-779 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNI-
TY COMMISSION v. METROPOLITAN EDU-
CATIONAL ENTERPRISES INC.
Definition of employer-Number of employees on
payroll.
Ruling below (CA 7, 60 F.3d 1225, 64 LW
2071, 68 FEP Cases 499):
Definition of "employer" in Title VII of 1964
Civil Rights Act, which includes those with "fif-
teen or more employees in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calen-
dar year," requires that at least 15 employees be
at workplace or on paid leave for each day of
work week in order for week to be counted, and is
not satisfied by "payroll method" based on num-
ber of employees on payroll in given week.
Question presented: Does Title VII apply to
employer who has 15 or more employees on its
payroll for every working day of requisite number
of weeks?
Petition for.certiorari filed 11/15/95, by Drew
S. Days III, Sol. Gen., Deval L. Patrick, Asst.
Atty. Gen., Paul Bender, Dpty. Sol. Gen., Beth S.
Brinkmann, Asst. to Sol. Gen., C. Gregory Stew-
art, EEOC General Counsel, Gwendolyn Young
Reams, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Carolyn L. Wheel-
er, Asst. Gen. Counsel, and Dori K. Bernstein,
EEOC Atty.
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EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
Darlene Walters, Intervening Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
METROPOLITAN EDUCATIONAL ENTERPRISES, INCORPORATED,
and Leonard Bieber, Defendants-Appellees
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
60 F.3d 1225
July 18, 1995.
... CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge.
This case presents the question whether, by virtue of recent legislative developments or a closer look at
old ones, this Court should overrule its decision in Zimmerman v. North American Signal Co. In that case,
we defined "employer" in the context of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), a
construction since extended to other anti-discrimination legislation including Title VII. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") urges us to adopt a more expansive definition. Intervening
plaintiff Darlene Walters joins in this plea for the simple reason that our Zimmerman definition forecloses
her Title VII retaliatory discharge claim against the defendants, her former employer and the company's
president. We are not persuaded that subsequent events dictate overruling Zimmerman, however, and
therefore reject the EEOC's and Walters' invitation to do so.
BACKGROUND
The EEOC sued Metropolitan under § 704(a) of Title VII in 1993, alleging that Metropolitan had fired
Walters three years earlier in retaliation for her filing of a gender discrimination charge. Walters
subsequently intervened as plaintiff. Metropolitan moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, alleging that the company was not an "employer" under Title VII, and the parties proceeded to
discovery on that question. In August 1994, after analyzing the parties' stipulations regarding Metropolitan's
payroll records, the district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground that Metropolitan did
not qualify as an employer under Title VII and there was accordingly no federal jurisdiction.
Under Title VII, an employer is "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen
or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year." The statute does not explicitly prescribe a method of counting employees to verify whether
the requisite minimum of 15 is reached, but two have emerged from case law. One, endorsed by the EEOC
and adopted by a number of courts, is the "payroll method." It looks at the number of employees maintained
on an employer's payroll within a given week: if this number is at least 15 for at least 20 calendar weeks the
jurisdictional minimum is satisfied, regardless of whether or not every employee on the payroll shows up for
work every day of the calendar week.
The alternative method counts all salaried employees toward the minimum, but takes a different approach
toward hourly or part-time workers. Such workers are considered employees only on days when they are
physically present at work or are on paid leave. The jurisdictional minimum of employees must be at the
workplace or on paid leave for each day of the work week, or the week will not be counted.
In Zimmerman, the Seventh Circuit endorsed this counting system and rejected the payroll approach. The
panel in that case examined the statutory language of the ADEA and focused on its provision (like Title VII's)
that an employer must have the requisite number of employees "for each working day of a week before that
week can be counted toward the jurisdictional minimum." Seeing no way to reconcile the phrase "for each
working day" with the payroll method, the panel held that the correct method excluded hourly paid workers
on days when they were neither working nor on paid leave. To conclude otherwise, the Zimmerman panel
held, would render the words "for each working day" superfluous and would be contrary to the "explicit
definitional restriction chosen by Congress." The panel also noted that had Congress wanted to define the
jurisdictional minimum in terms of the number of employees on the payroll each week, it could certainly have
done so.
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ANALYSIS
The EEOC and Walters aim a fusillade of arguments at Zimmerman. Primarily they contend that in
enacting the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), Congress endorsed the payroll method over the
Zimmerman alternative in a manner that counsels deference from this Court. They also point to other case
law and the EEOC's own guidelines which are contrary to the holding in Zimmerman. Finally, they submit
that the payroll approach comports better with public policy considerations.
In considering these arguments, we bear in mind that compelling reasons are required to overturn Circuit
precedent. "Stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law," and has even greater force when
the precedent in question involves a statutory construction.
We also note that this Court based Zimmerman on a reading of the statute's plain text that we continue
to endorse. As the Zimmerman panel noted, the phrase "for each working day" must be given some meaning
within the context of the statute, and the most natural interpretation of that phrase looks to the number of
employees physically at work on each day of the week. Plaintiffs suggest an alternative interpretation that
looks to situations when an employee joins or exits the payroll mid-week; this seems a highly unlikely
reading of the statute, particularly since instances where employees begin work on Wednesdays or depart on
Thursdays are unlikely to occur with sufficient frequency to merit inclusion in a federal anti-discrimination
statute.
While agreeing that the statute could have been worded more clearly, we believe that the Zimmerman
court's interpretation of its plain text has stood the test of time and a new set of appellate eyes. Generally,
ajudicial construction of the plain language of the statute ends the matter conclusively: the law is clear that
when a court can glean the meaning of a statute from its text, it should look no further.
Notwithstanding this fact, plaintiffs contend that the recent passage of the FMLA, with a definition of
"employer" that closely tracks those in the ADEA and in Title VII, is reason enough for us to re-examine
Zimmerman 's holding. The Senate Report for the FMLA endorses the payroll approach to identifying
employers:
The quoted language parallels language used in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and is intended
to receive the same interpretation. As most courts and the EEOC have interpreted this language, "employs
* * * employees for each working day" is intended to mean "employ" in the sense of maintain on the payroll.
It is not necessary that every employee actually perform work on each working day to be considered for this
purpose. Such congressional commentary, unfortunately for plaintiffs, has little effect on our view of Title
VII. First, the Congress that passed the FMLA has no special sanction to interpret the actions of a previous
Congress. "The interpretation given by one Congress (or a committee or Member thereof) to an earlier
statute is of little assistance in discerning the meaning of that statute."
Second, although plaintiffs designate the adoption of the FMLA as a "significant development of the law
on the proper interpretation of the statutory definition of 'employer' contained in Title VII," this purported
legal milestone occurred not within the text of the statute, but within legislative history, which has no force
of law. As the District of Columbia Circuit recently observed, "A congressional report, even a conference
report, is not legislation ... and it does not change the law."
The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the notion that judicial interpretation of a statute owes
deference to language in a legislative report. In Pierce v. Underwood, the Court held that where there was
an "almost uniform appellate interpretation" of legislation, re-enactment of the same statutory language
would be presumed to re-enact that "settled judicial interpretation" regardless of a legislative report to the
contrary. While further action taken by Congress can justify the abandonment of statutory precedent,
legislative history is not akin to legislative action.
In this case, as plaintiffs point out, there is an existing Circuit split, not a settled judicial interpretation,
regarding the correct means of determining who is an employer. Still, we note that had Congress truly
intended to enact the payroll method into law, it certainly could have done so in clear and unambiguous terms.
Instead, knowing (because Zimmerman and other like cases so instructed it) that Title VII's and the ADEA's
"for each working day" language was problematic, Congress chose not to respond to these concerns in
enacting the FMLA. If indeed Congress wished to resolve the Circuit conflict in a particular direction, this
was "a strange way to make a change."
Plaintiffs also argue that judicial and regulatory authority from other Circuits and from the EEOC
support overruling Zimmerman. Among our sister Circuits, the First and Fifth have adopted the payroll
method, as have a number of district courts; the Eighth Circuit and several other district courts have adopted
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the Zimmerman approach. The EEOC's Statement of Policy Guidance explicitly rejects the Zimmerman
approach and endorses the payroll method.
Regarding the Circuit split, it is enough to note the large number of recent cases on both sides of the
issue; that some courts have disagreed with our analysis while others have adopted it hardly presents a
pressing reason to overturn settled precedent. The EEOC's Compliance Manual, on the other hand, was
promulgated well after our decision in Zimmerman. While we afford deference to legitimate agency
interpretations of statutory language made before we have ruled on an issue, the converse is not true: the
judiciary, not administrative agencies, is the final arbiter of statutory construction.
Finally, plaintiffs urge us to consider potential policy problems inherent in our retention of the
Zimmerman standard in the face of a conflicting interpretation regarding the FMLA. We have not yet been
asked to interpret the FMLA and decline to create a conflict where none yet exists. Plaintiffs also present a
parade of horribles that could result from continued application of Zimmerman, most notably an employer's
ability to evade the strictures of anti-discrimination legislation simply by structuring operations to avoid
having the jurisdictional minimum present on each working day. Yet in more than a decade since this Court
ruled in Zimmerman, this parade has had conspicuously few participants. Finally, plaintiffs argue that the
payroll method is simpler to implement; this rationale, however, simply is not sufficient to override settled
statutory interpretation.
CONCLUSION
Failing to see a compelling reason for overturning our Circuit precedent in Zimmerman, we affirm the
judgment of the district court dismissing plaintiffs' suit for lack of jurisdiction.
RIPPLE, Circuit Judge, concurring.
I join the judgment of the court. Although the correctness of Zimmerman v. North American Signal
Company, is not free from doubt, I must conclude, with some reluctance, that the EEOC has not made a
sufficiently strong case to warrant our overruling established precedent of long standing. As the majority
notes, our obligation to adhere to the doctrines of stare decisis and precedent is especially strong when we
are dealing with matters of statutory construction. That obligation is tempered somewhat by our obligation
to reassess our work when a thoughtful divergence of opinion emerges from the other circuits. Upon
examination of the case law to the contrary, however, I cannot say that those cases cast such a shadow on
Zimmerman as to justify its overruling. This issue is one, however, that deserves definitive legislative
attention. The ambiguity of the present situation ought to be clarified. The scope of Title VII ought to be
the same in Boston and New Orleans as it is in Chicago.
200
95-1521 DEPT. OF STATE v. LEGAL ASSIST-
ANCE FOR VIETNAMESE ASYLUM SEEKERS
INC.
Immigrant visa applications-Vietnamese appli-
cants.
First ruling below (CA DC, 45 F.3d 469):
Department of State's interpretation and appli-
cation of 22 CFR 42.61, which provides that,
"[u]nless otherwise directed by the Department,"
alien applying for immigrant visa shall apply at
consular office where he resides (or can remain
physically present until application is processed),
to allow department, under "unless otherwise
directed" proviso, to cease processing Vietnamese
immigrants in Hong Kong at consular office and
require instead that they return to Vietnam for
visa processing in accordance with Comprehen-
sive Plan of Action adopted by nations in region,
discriminates against Vietnamese immigrants on
basis of their nationality in violation of Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, which provides in 8
USC 1152(a) that "no person shall ... be dis-
criminated against in the issuance of an immi-
grant visa because of the person's ... nationality
... or place of residence."
Second ruling below (CA DC, 2/2/96):
Because challenged policy is likely to be ap-
plied to individual plaintiff if her current applica-
tion for immigrant visa is turned down, case is
not moot, and thus government's petition for
rehearing, is denied.
Questions presented: (1) Does policy of U.S.
Government not to accept immigrant visa appli-
cations from Vietnamese migrants who have been
determined not to be refugees until they return to
their country of origin violate 8 USC 1152(a)(1),
which provides that no person shall be discrimi-
nated against in issuance of immigrant visa be-
cause of that person's nationality? (2) May court
review decision not to process immigrant visa
application based on consular venue
considerations?
Petition for certiorari filed 3/21/96, by Drew
S. Days III, Sol. Gen., Frank W. Hunger, Asst.
Atty. Gen., Edwin S. Kneedler, Dpty. Sol. Gen.,
Paul R.Q. Wolfson, Asst. to Sol. Gen., and Mi-
chael J. Singer and Robert M. Loeb, Justice
Dept. attys.
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S.F. COUNSEL PRESSURING U.S. ON VIET REFUGEES
The Recorder
Tuesday, May 21, 1996
Keith Donoghue
One of the world's longtime migration hot spots, Southeast Asia, again burst
onto the international scene earlier this month when Vietnamese refugees began
rioting and breaking out of a Hong Kong detention compound.
- The frustrations of the detainees have long been on the mind of one San
Francisco lawyer in particular. Working with co-counsel in Washington, D.C.,
immigration attorney Robert Jobe has been pursuing several cases aimed at
forcing the U.S. government to make haste in admitting Vietnamese detainees in
Hong Kong who are eligible for U.S. visas.
In a no-holds-barred battle with the U.S. Department of State, Jobe has won
some and lost some. But the most significant ruling in the case was a victory for
the detainees: In February of last year, the D.C. Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals
ruled that the American consul general in Hong Kong was unlawfully
discriminating against Vietnamese on the basis of their nationality. The State
Department has filed a petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court.
At issue in US. Department ofState v. Legal Assistance for Vietnamese
Asylum Seekers are procedures designed to encourage migrants who do not face
persecution to return to Vietnam. Rather than help them find other avenues for
entering the United States -- for example, through visas reserved for aliens with
family ties in the country - the counsel general in 1994 told applicants that their
requests would be processed only in Vietnam.
In response, Jobe and three lawyers from the Washington, D.C., office of
New York's Hughes Hubbard & Reed sued on behalf of a class of aliens who
have U.S. relatives willing to sponsor them for entry visas. Jobe calls U.S. policy
requiring these aliens to return to Vietnam "cruel."
"Those people have the right to leave [Hong Kong detention camps]," he
says. "They want to come to this country; they have the right to come to this
country."
The State Department maintains that its policy is a matter of diplomacy
required by an international agreement designed to discourage waves of
Vietnamese migration. As such, the department argues, it is entitled to deference
from the courts. The department also maintains that American immigration
policy toward Vietnamese migrants has been generous, citing a program through
which 410,000 Vietnamese nationals have been resettled in the United States.
Although Jobe has won a favorable appellate ruling, his plaintiffs, who seek
class certification, have to contend with a companion case that could spell
trouble. In that case, after a U.S. district judge ordered the consul general in
Hong Kong to process the visa applications of a number of detainees, the D.C.
Circuit moved the appeal directly to the en banc court.
The Recorder Copyright 1996
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LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR VIETNAMESE ASYLUM SEEKERS;
Thua Van Le; Em Van Vo; Thu Hoa Thi Dang; Truc Boa Thi Vo, Appellants
V.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, et al., Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
45 F.3d 469
Feb. 3, 1995
... SENTELLE, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment by a not-for-profit corporation, Legal Assistance
for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, Inc. ("LAVAS"); two detained Vietnamese immigrants in Hong Kong; and
their American citizen sponsors, against the United States Department of State and various government
officials in their official capacities (collectively "the State Department" or "Department"). Appellants allege
the State Department violated its own regulations as well as the Immigration and Nationality Act when
refusing to process the visa applications of Vietnamese immigrants, who had not been screened in as political
refugees, at the United States Consulate in Hong Kong. Because we find the district court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of appellees, we reverse and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
Since April 1975, when the North Vietnamese captured Saigon, large numbers of refugees have fled
Vietnam to Hong Kong. Between June 1979 and June 1988, the treatment of these persons was guided by
an informal agreement under which Hong Kong and other nations in the region committed themselves to
granting temporary refuge in exchange for a commitment from the United States and other western countries
to resettle these immigrants. As part of this agreement, the Hong Kong Government accorded these
immigrants presumptive refugee status.
However, due to an increase in the number of persons fleeing Vietnam in the late 1980s, the Hong Kong
Government announced it was revoking the presumptive refugee status of the Vietnamese immigrants as of
June 15, 1988. Thereafter, all new arrivals would be detained and screened by local immigration authorities
to determine whether they individually qualified for refugee status. In June 1989, this approach was adopted
throughout the region in the form of a Comprehensive Plan of Action ("CPA"), a joint statement of policy
also adopted by the United States. The CPA provides that asylum seekers who are screened out, that is those
who do not qualify as refugees under the criteria established in the Refugee Convention, should return to
Vietnam. Once returned, those eligible for immigrant visas may apply through the Orderly Departure
Program, established to provide for the departure of Vietnamese directly from Vietnam to their resettlement
destinations.
The United States permits Vietnamese immigrants, who have as sponsors close relatives who are United
States citizens or permanent resident aliens in the United States, to enter as beneficiaries of immigrant visas
under the criteria set forth in the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"). To obtain a visa, eligible
Vietnamese immigrants and their sponsors must complete several steps. First, the sponsor must file a
petition with the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"). If the INS approves the petition, the
Vietnamese applicant must complete and submit to the United States State Department an application for
an immigrant visa. Third, the applicant must provide various documents to a United States consulate, and
appear at the consulate for final processing of the visa application.
From June 1979 to April 1993, the State Department processed applications for Vietnamese boat people
in Hong Kong at the United States consulate. Although the Department directed its posts in November 1991
to advise screened out applicants to return to Vietnam, the United States consulate in Hong Kong ignored
this change in policy. The consulate continued to process the visa applications from screened out
Vietnamese. To facilitate this processing, the Consulate General issued letters to the Hong Kong
Government requesting that Vietnamese be made available for interviews at the consulate.
In April 1993, however, after an exchange of cables in which the United States consulate in Hong Kong
argued it should be permitted to continue processing those immigrants who had been screened out, the
Department specifically instructed the consulate to cease such activity. Applicants who had been screened
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out were thus required to return to Vietnam for visa processing. The United States consulate officially
informed the Hong Kong Government of the policy change on September 24, 1993.
On February 25, 1994, appellants brought this action against the State Department and various officials.
Appellants sought declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of a class of Vietnamese nationals desiring to
be processed at the United States consulate in Hong Kong, yet who were instructed they would have to return
to Vietnam for processing. Appellants also sought such relief on behalf of a class of sponsoring United
States citizens and permanent residents who were related to the detained plaintiffs.
Appellants alleged that the State Department's change in policy was in violation of the INA and the
regulations promulgated thereunder, the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), and the United States
Constitution. Following a hearing consolidating appellants' application for a preliminary injunction with the
trial of the action on its merits, the district court issued a final order on April 28, 1994, granting the State
Department's motion for summary judgment and denying appellants' cross motion for summary judgment.
II. DISCUSSION
As a threshold issue, appellees contend all of the appellants lack standing to bring this action. The APA
grants standing to any party who is "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of
a relevant statute." The party must suffer injury in fact, and the interest sought to be protected must arguably
be within the zone of interests protected by the statute in question. We first address the issue of whether the
sponsoring resident appellants possess standing. Appellants argue these plaintiffs suffer the requisite injury
in fact and are within the zone of interest protected by the INA.
We agree. First, as to injury in fact, the State Department's conduct prolongs the separation of immediate
family members. The detained appellants must either remain in Hong Kong, where they are denied the
opportunity to be processed, or, if they are required first to return to Vietnam, their processing will be further
delayed. We have previously found injury in fact where the plaintiffs were far less aggrieved than in the case
at bar.
Second, the resident appellants are within the zone of interest protected by the INA. As the Supreme
Court held in Clarke, the zone of interest test does not necessarily require a specific congressional purpose
to benefit the would-be plaintiff. It is sufficient if the plaintiffs " 'establish that their particular interest[ ]'
" falls within the area of interests Congress intended to protect The INA authorizes the immigration of
family members of United States citizens and permanent resident aliens. In originally enacting the INA,
Congress "implement[ed] the underlying intention of our immigration laws regarding the preservation of the
family unit" Given the nature and purpose of the statute, the resident appellants fall well within the zone of
interest Congress intended to protect.
Appellees also contend that neither LAVAS nor the detained appellants in Hong Kong have standing.
We need not reach this issue. If one party to an action has standing, a court need not decide the standing
issue as to other parties when it makes no difference to the merits of the case.
We now turn to the merits of the appeal. Appellants allege the State Department's refusal to process the
visas of the detained appellants in Hong Kong violates 22 C.F.R. § 42.61(a) of the Department's visa
regulations. The regulation concerns the circumstances under which an immigrant seeking a visa can have
his case processed in a given consular district. The parties dispute the proper interpretation of this regulation,
but we need not construe the version of the regulation in effect at the time the dispute arose because it has
been rendered moot by 1994 amendments to 22 C.F.R. § 42.6 1(a). Visa applicants have no vested right in
the issuance of a visa. They are certainly not entitled to prospective relief based on a no longer effective
version of a later amended regulation. It is the amended version which will now govern the admission of the
detained Vietnamese, and it is that version we must construe: (a) Alien to apply in consular district of
residence. Unless otherwise directed by the Department, an alien applying for an immigrant visa shall make
application at the consular office having jurisdiction over the alien's place of residence; except that, unless
otherwise directed by the Department, an alien physically present in an area but having no residence therein
may make application at the consular office having jurisdiction over that area if the alien can establish that
he or she will be able to remain in the area for the period required to process the application....
Under this regulation, an alien desiring a visa shall apply at the consular office where he resides.
Alternatively, an alien physically present in an area has the option of applying at the consular office having
jurisdiction over that area ifhe satisfies a precondition. However, asserting its authority under the regulation
to "direct otherwise," the Department has ceased processing Vietnamese immigrants in Hong Kong at the
consular office. Nationals of other countries not subject to the CPA are still processed at the consular office.
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Although appellees' regulation permits this differing treatment, appellants claim the discrimination
violates 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) of the INA. This section provides "no person shall ... be discriminated against
in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person's . . . nationality ... or place of residence."
Appellants argue that the Department violated the statute in drawing an explicit distinction between
Vietnamese nationals and nationals of other countries when refusing to process the visas of the screened out
Vietnamese immigrants. Appellants assert this statute compels this court to invalidate any attempt to draw
a distinction based on nationality in the issuance of visas. In contrast, appellees urge us to adopt the position
that so long as they possess a rational basis for making the distinction, they are not in violation of the statute.
Appellees maintain the goal of encouraging voluntary repatriation and the aims of the CPA certainly provide
a rational basis for the practices and policies in question.
We agree with appellants' interpretation of the statute. Congress could hardly have chosen more explicit
language. While we need not decide in the case before us whether the State Department could never justify
an exception under the provision, such a justification, if possible at all, must be most compelling--perhaps
a national emergency. We cannot rewrite a statutory provision which by its own terms provides no
exceptions or qualifications simply on a preferred "rational basis."
Appellees rely on Narenji v. Civiletti for the proposition that their nationality-based discrimination
passes muster under section 1152(a) as long as they possess a rational justification. In Narenji, we upheld
an INS regulation requiring nonimmigrant alien students in the United States who were natives or citizens
of Iran to report to an INS office to provide information concerning their nonimmigrant status. The INA
delegated to the Attorney General the authority to prescribe conditions of admission to the United States for
nonimmigrant aliens. The INA also authorized the Attorney General to order the deportation of any
nonimmigrant alien who failed to comply with the conditions of his status. We held that a broad mandate
of the INA delegating to the Attomey General the authority to prescribe conditions of admission to the United
States on the part of nonimmigrant aliens authorized the Attorney General to draw distinctions among
nonimmigrant aliens on the basis of nationality. We then examined whether the regulation violated the
Constitution. In finding no violation, we stated that we would sustain classifications on the basis of
nationality drawn by the Congress or the Executive in the immigration field, so long as they were not wholly
irrational. Appellants argue that Narenji compels us to sustain the distinctions drawn in the present
regulations.
Appellees' reliance on Narenji is misplaced. In that case the court was considering the power of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service to promulgate nationality-based regulations and the constitutionality
of such regulations if otherwise properly promulgated. Under constitutional standards we found no equal
protection violation. The Narenji court did not consider the effect on the agency regulatory authority to
make distinctions of a statute flatly forbidding nationality-based discrimination. Here the agency's
nationality-based regulation runs athwart such a statute. The appellees' proffered statutory interpretation,
leaving it fully possessed of all its constitutional power to make nationality-based distinctions, would render
8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) a virtual nullity.
Section 1152 is a part of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This is an act committed to the
administration of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and we review its interpretations deferentially
under the standard of Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Even under that
standard the Service's present interpretation fails. Where Congress has unambiguously expressed its intent,
we need go no further. Here, Congress has unambiguously directed that no nationality-based discrimination
shall occur. There is no room for the Service's interpretation proffered by the Department.
Under the APA, this court is obligated to hold unlawful and set aside agency action found to be not in
accordance with law. The interpretation and application of the regulation so as to discriminate against
Vietnamese on the basis of their nationality is in violation of the Act, and therefore not in accordance with
law.
The dissent's contention that the distinction drawn by the Department is the permissible line between
legal and illegal immigrants as opposed to the impermissible nationality-based line between Vietnamese and
non-Vietnamese illegal immigrants is simply not supported by the record. The case reaches us on appeal
from summary judgment. At the summary judgment stage in the district court, the defendants expressly
stated in their "Statement in Response to Plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts as to which there is no
Genuine Dispute," that "in approximately April, 1993, the Department changed its practice or policy relating
to the processing of immigrant visa petitions of Vietnamese nationals residing illegally in Hong Kong." The
Department has never contended here or in the district court that this change was made as to any other
nationals than Vietnamese nationals nor that illegally present nationals of other countries would be treated
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the same as illegally present Vietnamese nationals. We neither hold nor imply that any statute requires that
the same treatment be afforded legal and illegal status.
1. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees and remand
the case for a disposition consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
My objections to the majority opinion are, first, that the decision on the merits is in error, and second,
that the prospect of mootness should have precluded any decision on the merits. I realize that discussing the
issues in this sequence inverts the usual order. But the majority's mistake on the merits is the more serious
in terms of lasting consequences and I shall therefore begin with it.
The British crown colony of Hong Kong is one of the most densely populated regions in the world.
Within its tiny area, nearly six million people reside. Because of Hong Kong's proximity to Vietnam it has
become one of the prime destinations for Vietnamese "boat people," more than 750,000 of whom have fled
to the countries of Southeast Asia during the past nineteen years. After the fall of Saigon in 1975, the United
States pressed "first asylum" countries such as Hong Kong to provide a safe haven for these people until they
could be resettled elsewhere or returned to Vietnam. But as the years passed, the influx of boat people
continued. Since June 1988, more than 71,000 individuals from Vietnam have arrived on Hong Kong's
shores and wound up in its detention camps. In an effort to stem the tide and to relieve itself of the burdens
imposed by this mass exodus, Hong Kong entered into a Comprehensive Plan of Action with fifty other
nations, including the United States. Developed in 1989, the Plan governs the screening of asylum seekers
and provides that those persons not recognized as "refugees" pursuant to international criteria--those who
have been "screened out"--must return to Vietnam in order to seek resettlement in a third country.
For the moment, Hong Kong and the other "first asylum" countries are exercising forbearance. They are
following a program of voluntary repatriation for those who have been "screened out." Hong Kong is, in
other words, asking these people to depart voluntarily rather than forcibly expelling them, as it presumably
has every right to do since they are there illegally. The head of the State Department's Bureau of Refugee
Programs believes that it is "fundamentally important to the success" of the Comprehensive Plan that
"Vietnamese in the camps have the clear perception that there is no alternative for the screened out but to
return to Vietnam." "[A]nything that clouds that perception or gives birth to rumors that resettlement of the
screened out is possible will reduce voluntary repatriation and create a situation in which resort to mandatory
repatriation by first asylum governments is made more likely."
The potential repercussions of the majority's decision are, to say the least, disquieting. The flight of
illegal aliens to Hong Kong and elsewhere has created an international crisis. Fifty nations have sought to
avert the flood by stopping the flow. Not processing their visas in Hong Kong removes one of the reasons
so many of these people are leaving their homeland and embarking on the dangerous journey across the South
China Sea. Now the majority holds that it is illegal for the United States consular office in Hong Kong to
abide by the Comprehensive Plan and refuse to process immigrant visas for Vietnamese boat people detained
in the camps. Why? Because this is discrimination on the basis of nationality and 8 U.S.C. § 1152 provides,
with certain exceptions, that "no person shall ... be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant
visa because of the person's race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence."
But it is not nationality that precludes visa processing. The so-called "discrimination" the majority
detects stems from the illegal status of the screened out boat people, rather than from the fact (if it is a fact)
that they are all Vietnamese nationals. Compare two Vietnamese nationals in Hong Kong, one there illegally
and currently living in a detention camp and the other there legally, perhaps working or on holiday. As
implemented, the current regulation allows processing of the legal Vietnamese but not the illegal one. That
is not discrimination on the basis of nationality, but discrimination on the basis of legality. And the statute
does not forbid it Still less is the State Department's current regulation a "nationality based regulation," as
the majority supposes. The regulation reads: (a) Alien to apply in consular district of residence. Unless
otherwise directed by the Department, an alien applying for an immigrant visa shall make application at the
consular office having jurisdiction over the alien's place of residence; except that, unless otherwise directed
by the Department, an alien physically present in an area but having no residence therein may make
application at the consular office having jurisdiction over that area if the alien can establish that he or she
will be able to remain in the area for the period required to process the application.. . . There is not a word
here relating to an alien's nationality. Within the United States illegal aliens are treated far differently than
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those who are legally here. It is beyond belief that distinguishing--that is, discriminating--among visa
applicants on the same ground is forbidden. The regulation, through the words "unless otherwise directed,"
permits the State Department to make this distinction and section 1152 does not forbid it.
To show that the State Department was discriminating against the detainees because they were
Vietnamese, the majority quotes a statement of the defendants and italicizes two words: "in approximately
April, 1993, the Department changed its practice or policy relating to the processing of immigrant visa
petitions of Vietnamese nationals residing illegally in Hong Kong." Consider the quotation again, this time
without the distracting italics. It indicates that the State Department's policy dealt only with those
Vietnamese "residing illegally in Hong Kong." That makes my point, not the majority's. Other Vietnamese
in Hong Kong may be processed What causes the difference in treatment? Not nationality, but the common
sense international distinction between aliens who enter a country illegally and those who enter legally.
There may be room for an argument that the State Department will process other illegal immigrants--that
is, other than the Hong Kong detainees--in foreign countries despite their illegal status, and therefore the
Vietnamese boat people are being singled out because they are Vietnamese. But there is no evidence that this
sort of thing is going on; and the regulation is so new that I doubt whether any world-wide customary
practice under it can yet be discerned.
Given the profound consequences of judicial intervention and the danger that a decision might dismantle
this carefully wrought international program designed to bring a humane and swift end to the continuing
problem of illegal immigration, it is critical that we decide only what we have to decide. The majority has
followed another course, which brings me to my second objection. Of the five plaintiffs, two are--or
were--screened out Vietnamese residing in one of the Hong Kong camps. The oral argument in this case
revealed that these alien-plaintiffs may have already been processed. Their preference numbers came up
nearly a year ago. At the time of the district court's decision--April 1994--the State Department was still
processing detainees whose visa applications were current, that is, those whose preference numbers had been
reached. It therefore appears quite likely that the alien-plaintiffs are now in the United States. If they are,
their two sponsors, who are also plaintiffs, have no further interest in the case. The case was never certified
as a class action. The district court made no findings regarding the status of the alien-plaintiffs and neither
the plaintiffs' nor the government's counsel at oral argument could say whether a live controversy still exists.
If the alien-plaintiffs have already received relief, the case could not be saved by qualifying as one
capable of repetition but evading review. The capable of repetition part of the formulation means the
complaining party is likely to be subjected to the same challenged activity in the future. We so held in
Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. District of Columbia. If the individual Hong Kong plaintiffs
already had their applications processed, they will not suffer the same fate in the future.
Without the aliens or their sponsors in the case, our deciding the merits would be warranted only if the
remaining plaintiff, LAVAS, had standing, which it does not. The harm it alleges--a possible future strain
on its resources-is general and speculative; and the organization is not within the zone of interest the statute
was meant to protect.
The proper course therefore should have been to remand the case to the district court to make a finding
whether the case is moot. We do not have to be entirely certain the case has become moot; if there is cause
to believe it has met that fate, a remand is warranted. That is what the Supreme Court does when it
encounters this sort of situation.
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AGAINST DOCTOR-ASSISTED SUICIDE
Rush to a Lethal Judgement
The New York Times
Sunday, July 21, 1996
Stephen L. Carter
Many years ago, a psychiatrist who was treating
someone I loved asked me to remember that she had
the right to kill herself if she wanted to. Sometimes,
he said softly, the decision to commit suicide is the
decision of a rational mind, a reasonable if tragic
answer to the question of whether life is worth
continuing.
When he said "right," he did not, of course,
mean constitutional right; he meant moral right, a
part of human dignity. As long as her mind was
sound, she had the right as an autonomous
individual to decide whether to continue living. Her
responsibilities to her loved ones and her
community might have carried weight in the moral
calculus, but the final decision had to be hers alone.
Although I saw the logic of his position then
and see it now, the law has traditionally offered a
rather different understanding. Suicide was a felony
under England's common-law regime, and was
illegal everywhere in the United States into this
century. Some cynics have identified the age-old
prohibition on suicide as a matter of royal
selfishness -- at common law, if you committed a
felony, your worldly goods went to the crown -- but
the better answer is that the laws reflected a strong
belief that the lives of individuals belonged not to
themselves alone but to the communities in which
they lived and to the God who gave them breath.
Nowadays, we have a broader notion of
individual autonomy. Our laws increasingly reflect
the belief that our lives do belong to us alone. Some
anti-suicide statutes are still on the books, but today
the societal distaste for suicide is registered through
the civil, not the criminal, law: people who try
suicide but do not succeed may be involuntarily
hospitalized to determine whether they are
continuing threats to themselves. So although we
certainly try to prevent suicide, we no longer punish
it.
There is one exception: most jurisdictions
continue to treat the person who directly assists
someone else's suicide as a felon. That is the basis,
for example, of Michigan's prosecutions of the
notorious "suicide doctor," Jack Kevorkian, who, as
of this writing, has been involved in more than 30
suicides. Many a family harbors its secret story of
indirect assistance -- leaving the bottle of sleeping
pills within reach of the dying relative, for example
- but the reason for the secrecy in part has been the
traditional view that assistance of any kind is at least
immoral and often illegal.
In recent months, however, two Federal
appellate courts have held that terminally ill patients
have a constitutional right to seek the assistance of
physicians in ending their lives. With the entire
dispute plainly on its way to the Supreme Court
anyway, opponents and supporters of what has come
to be called the "right to die" are even now battling
their way through the implications. The moral
questions raised by assisted suicide are weighty, but
our ability as a society to deal with them has been
seriously weakened by the judicial rush to enshrine
one side's moral answer in the framework of
constitutional rights.
The two cases presented the same basic
question, but the courts dealt with it in very different
ways. In March, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, based in San Francisco, decided the case of
Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington,
resting the right to assisted suicide for the terminally
ill on the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment, the same provision in which the courts
have located the abortion right. The right to choose
how to end one's own life, the court explained, was
a direct descendant of the right to choose whether to
bear a child, and, as with abortion, the state must
have a very strong reason before it may interfere.
Then, less than a month later, the Second
Circuit struck down New York's assisted-suicide
ban in the case of Quill v. Vacco. The Second
Circuit rejected the due process argument, pointing
out that the United States Supreme Court has
limited that approach to cases in which the state is
interfering with a fundamental liberty "deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition," like the
freedom to many or procreate. The right to obtain
assistance in suicide, the court sensibly concluded,
does not fit this definition. But the Quill court found
a rationale of its own: the right to assisted suicide is
supported, said the judges, by another part of the
14th Amendment - the equal protection clause.
Why? Because New York allows mentally
competent terminally ill patients on life support to
direct the removal of the supporting apparatus, even
when the removal will hasten or directly cause their
deaths, but prohibits those who do not need life
support from obtaining drugs to hasten or directly
cause their deaths. So the state is discriminating, in
the court's terms, by allowing some of the terminally
ill, but not others, to die quickly.
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The logic of Quill, although more attractive
than that of Compassion in Dying, seems terribly
forced, not least because the state allows many other
distinctions among the terminally ill -- for example,
wealthier patients often have access to experimental
drugs and therapies that others do not. These
distinctions may not always seem sensible or fair
but they hardly rise to the level of constitutional
concern.
And there is a larger analytical problem with
both decisions. If the right to choose suicide with
the help of a physician is of constitutional
dimension, it is difficult to discern how it can be
limited to those who are terminally ill. Terminal
illness is not a legal category -- it is a medical
category, and one that even doctors sometimes have
trouble defining. Some of us who teach
constitutional law -- the old-fashioned types, I
suppose -- still tell our students that constitutional
rights arise by virtue of citizenship, not
circumstance. This implies that each of us (each
who is a competent adult, at least) possesses an
identical set of rights. So if there is indeed a
constitutional right to suicide, assisted or not, it
must attach to all citizens.
If the right to pursue assistance in suicide
attaches to all citizens, then the Constitution is at
present being violated by all the state laws
permitting the involuntary hospitalization of
individuals who try suicide. Instead of locking them
up, we should be asking them if they would like
assistance in their task. In fact, the Second Circuit
has matters precisely backward: if everybody except
the terminally ill were allowed to seek the assistance
of physicians in suicide, the equal protection claim
might have merit. If, on the other hand, the
terminally ill are allowed to seek suicide, the court's
concern for equality might suggest that everybody
should be allowed to do it, lest the state discriminate
between two groups who want to die, those who
desire to commit suicide because they are terminally
ill and those who desire to commit suicide because
they are dreadfully unhappy.
Except in emergencies, a court decision is the
worst way to resolve a moral dilemma.
Constitutional rights, as they mature, have a
nagging habit of bursting from the analytical
confinements in which they are spawned. When the
Supreme Court struck down organized classroom
prayer in 1962, nobody other than a few opponents
of the rulings, dismissed as cranks, envisioned a
future in which courts would order traditional
religious language and symbols stripped from
official buildings and state seals. And did the
justices who voted to legalize abortion in 1973
really imagine that two decades later, the United
States would be home to 1.5 million abortions a
year?
In the case of the right to assisted suicide, the
risks are many. For example, it is far from obvious
that the right can be limited to adults. The abortion
right isnt. The Supreme Court has ruled that
pregnant minors must be allowed to demonstrate to
a judge that they are mature enough to make up their
own minds about abortion. It does not take much of
a stretch to imagine a judge concluding that a young
person mature enough to decide that a child should
not come into the world is also mature enough to
decide that her (or his) own life is not worth living.
And there are other, more ominous difficulties.
Some worried medical ethicists have predicted that
a right to assisted suicide might lead exhausted
families to encourage terminally ill relatives to kill
themselves. Moreover, women are more likely than
men to try suicide, but men succeed much more
often than women. With the help of health care
workers, women, too, might begin to succeed at a
high rate. Is this form of gender equality what we
are looking for?
But the biggest problem with the idea of a
constitutional right to assisted suicide is that the
courts (if the decisions stand) are pre-empting a
moral debate that is, for most Americans, just
beginning. To criticize the constitutional foundation
for the recent decisions is not at all to suggest that
the policy questions are easy ones. There are strong,
thoughtful voices -- and plausible moral arguments
-- on both sides of the assisted-suicide debate, as
there are in the larger euthanasia debate. The
questions are vital ones: Do our mortal lives belong
to us alone or do they belong to the communities or
families in which we are embedded? Will this new
right give the dying a greater sense of control over
their circumstances, or will it weaken our respect for
life?
These are, as I said, weighty questions, and the
policy arguments on either side are the stuff of
which public political and moral debates are made.
And a thoughtful, well-reasoned debate over
assisted suicide is precisely what we as a nation
need; we do not need judicial intervention to put a
decisive end to a conversation that we as a people
have scarcely begun. Because the arguments on both
sides carry such strong moral plausibility -- and
because the claim of constitutional right is anything
but compelling -- the questions should be answered
through popular debate and perhaps legislation, not
through legal briefs and litigation. In an ideal world,
the Supreme Court would swiftly overturn Quill and
Compassion in Dying, allowing the rest of us the
space and time for the moral reflection that the issue
demands.
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APPEALS COURT WON'T REVIEW SUICIDE RULING
Decision Allowing Doctor-Assisted Deaths in Eight States Stands
Washington Officials Plan Appeal to Supreme Court
Los Angeles Times
Thursday, June 13, 1996
Henry Weinstein, Times Legal Affairs Writer
Despite two blistering dissents, a federal
appeals court in San Francisco on Wednesday
declined to review its landmark decision holding
that mentally competent, terminally ill adults have
a constitutional right to hasten their deaths with the
assistance of a physician.
The action by the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals clears the way for the state of Washington
to move forward with its effort to get the U.S.
Supreme Court to review the controversial March 6
decision. Washington Atty. Gen. Christine Gregoire
had announced earlier that she would go to the
Supreme Court, but that process was delayed after
a 9th Circuit judge asked that all 24 active 9th
Circuit judges review the decision in Compassion in
Dying vs. Washington.
The March decision held, by an 8-3 vote, that
Washington's law making physician-assisted suicide
a felony is a denial of due process of law under the
14th Amendment to the federal Constitution.
The ruling, written by Los Angeles Appellate
Judge Stephen Reinhardt, effectively struck down
similar statutes in seven other Western states that
are part of the 9th Circuit. On Wednesday, two
conservative appellate judges lambasted the
majority in the earlier decision for creating a new
constitutional right without any justification.
"No magician-not David Copperfield, not even
Harry Houdini--can produce a rabbit from a hat
unless the rabbit is in the hat to begin with," wrote
Judge Stephen S. Trott of Idaho.
"With all respect," Trott's dissent said,
Reinhardt, "has in fact succeeded in pulling a
nonexistent liberty interest out of thin constitutional
air, a liberty interest that does not exist in the
document itself."
Reinhardt's analysis relied heavily on language
drawn from U.S. Supreme Court abortion cases
because the issues have "compelling similarities," he
wrote.
Trott emphasized that the significance of the
case "has far more to do with our role and power as
federal judges than with the merits or desirability of
physician-assisted suicide. The issue most deserving
of attention is whether we have exceeded our lawful
interpretive power to remind the democratic process
what it can and cannot do."
Along the same line, Judge Diarmuid F.
O'Scannlain of Oregon noted that in 1991
Washington residents rejected an initiative
legalizing physician-assisted suicide.
O'Scannlain also chastised the majority of his
colleagues for declining to reconsider the decision.
"By our failure to convene the full court to rehear
this case, a mere one-third of the 24 active judges
eligible to vote has been empowered to strike down
criminal laws, not just in Washington," but also in
Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho,
Montana and Nevada, he wrote.
The March decision reinstated a 1994 ruling by
U.S. District Judge Barbara Rothstein in Seattle.
She agreed with the contentions of four physicians
and Compassion in Dying, a nonprofit organization
that provides support and counseling to terminally
ill adults considering suicide, that Washington's law
making assisted suicide a felony imposed an undue
burden on people seeking to hasten their death with
the help of a doctor. Her decision was overruled 2 to
1 by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeal, setting the
stage for the later 8-3 decision.
Initial appeals of a federal trial judge's decisions
are heard by three-judge panels. If a majority of the
judges of a circuit agree to do so, a panel decision
can be reviewed by all the judges in the circuit.
However, the 9th Circuit, the largest in the nation,
has a different procedure. Since the 9th Circuit was
expanded from 13 to 23 judges in 1979, the court
has been authorized to have 11-judge panels hold en
banc reviews.
The circuit's judges grant en banc review to only
a minuscule number of cases--about a dozen out of
4,500 cases a year--according to Cathy Catterson,
the court's chief clerk.
Moreover, this case marked only the third time
there had been a request for a review by all the
circuit's judges, and none of those requests has been
granted. Because of the way such issues are handled,
there is no written opinion explaining why the
majority of 9th Circuit judges declined further
review.
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However, USC constitutional law professor
Erwin Chemerinsky said he thought Wednesday's
decision "is much more about procedure than
substance. Even judges who may disagree with the
March ruling don't want to create the precedent of
the entire court sitting as a whole. Otherwise, you
wouldn't have finality after an en banc ruling
because there would be the possibility of another
hearing."
To buttress his point, Chemerinsky noted that
Judge Robert Beezer of Seattle, who wrote the lead
dissent to Reinhardt's opinion, did not dissent on
Wednesday, nor did Judge John Noonan of San
Francisco, who authored the original 9th Circuit
opinion upholding Washington's law. Chemerinsky
also noted that since there is a high likelihood that
the U.S. Supreme Court will take the case, several
9th Circuit judges probably thought further review
by the circuit would be "needless work."
Washington's initial brief to the Supreme Court is
due July 5.
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COLLEGES LOSE BIG RACE CASE
The Sacramento Bee
Tuesday, July 2, 1996
Aaron Epstein, Knight-Ridder Newspapers
Leaving legal clouds over the future of
affirmative action in higher education, the Supreme
Court on Monday allowed public colleges and
universities in three Southern states to be barred
from considering race or national origin in student
admissions.
The justices, refusing to hear objections from
the Clinton administration and 10 states, left intact
a New Orleans federal appeals court's ruling in
March that the University of Texas Law School's
affirmative action program amounted to
unconstitutional discrimination against whites.
But because the court didn't issue a ruling of its
own, it left no nationwide guidance on the current
validity of its 1978 conclusion in the landmark
Bakke case that colleges could consider race as one
of many factors in an effort to obtain a diverse
student body.
The Bakke case has set the standard for
affirmative action in higher education. Allan Bakke,
who is white, sued the University of California after
he was denied admission to the UC Davis Medical
School in 1973 and 1974. The court ordered Bakke
admitted and ruled that strict racial quotas in
admissions were unconstitutional. But the court also
ruled that an applicant's racial or ethnic background
could be one among many considerations in
admissions.
The Texas law school program, aimed at
increasing the enrollment of African Americans and
Latinos, was invalidated in Texas, Louisiana and
Mississippi by a panel of the U.S. 5th Circuit Court
of Appeals, which said Bakke was no longer valid
law. That decision was unique among federal
appeals courts.
As a result of the Supreme Court's refusal to
intervene, the appeals court ruling is certain to be
cited in support of efforts to scrap similar
affinnative action programs beyond the three states.
Last July, the UC Board of Regents banned
using race as a criterion in admissions. A
race-neutral admissions system will be phased in,
beginning with professional and graduate programs
next year, and will be fully in place for the 1998
freshman class.
The appeals court decision goes even further
than the regents' ban, UC officials said Monday. UC
lawyers said the ruling appeared to call into
question UC's extensive network of recruitment and
counseling programs in the state's high schools
aimed at boosting college eligibility among African
Americans and Latinos. The appeals court said that
building a racially diverse student body is not a
constitutionally permissible goal. The UC regents,
in banning racially based affirmative action, upheld
diversity as a legitimate university goal.
Ward Connerly, chairman of the California
Civil Rights Initiative, the anti-affirmative action
measure on the state's November ballot, said: "The
court, in effect, has endorsed the lower court's
ruling. We are witnessing the end of an era. There
now can be no argument that racial and gender
preferences in government programs are
unconstitutional."
But Theodore Shaw of the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund said he did not
expect a similar affirmative action case to reach the
high court soon. Meanwhile, "affirmative action,
while still under siege, is alive."
The justices' action leaves the nation with no
uniform, nationwide answer to some fundamental
constitutional questions on affirmative action in
higher education: Can race or national origin be
considered in public college admissions? Is diversity
of the student body a sufficiently important
governmental goal to justify such affirmative
action?
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by David
Souter, acknowledged that the issue was "of great
national importance." However, she said the
disputed affirmative action program at the
University of Texas Law School had been
discontinued and replaced, leaving the justices with
no current dispute to review. "This court ... reviews
judgments, not opinions," Ginsburg wrote.
"Accordingly, we must await a final judgment on a
program genuinely in controversy before addressing
the important question" raised in the case, Texas vs.
Hopwood.
The lead plaintiff was Cheryl Hopwood, a white
graduate of California State University, Sacramento,
who was rejected for admission to the University of
Texas law school. Hopwood, a white working
mother who is raising a severely disabled daughter,
was turned down in 1992 despite her high college
grades and law school admissions test score.
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Hopwood and three rejected white male
applicants filed a suit that was dubbed "Bakke II."
They said they were victims of an affirmative action
program that gave preferences to African Americans
and Latinos who had lower academic qualifications
than theirs.
(Bee staff writer James Richardson and The Bee
Capitol Bureau contributed to this report.)
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TEXAS HIT HARD BY HOPWOOD DECISION
State Moves Fast While Mississippi,
Louisiana Hold Back on Affirmative Action Changes
Austin American-Statesman
Thursday, July 11, 1996
Mary Ann Roser
Of the three states that must live under a court
decision ending university affirmative action
programs, Texas is undergoing the greatest
upheaval and appears to be the biggest loser.
While Louisiana and Mississippi are still
discussing what changes, if any, might be required
now that the Supreme Court has refused to hear the
so-called Hopwood case, Texas has been quick to
react.
Some critics, including Al Kauffman, a senior
attorney for the Mexican American Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, say Texas has "gone too far
too quickly."
Despite that, Attorney General Dan Morales
advised last week that no college or university in
Texas, public or private, can take race into account
when admitting students or awarding scholarships,
fellowships or other financial aid -- common
strategies for attracting minorities to diversify
campuses.
Neither Louisiana nor Mississippi has made any
such declarations. Lawyers and higher education
officials in both states said they are still studying
Hopwood and might - or might not -- make
adjustments. Both states are operating under
previous legal agreements and appear to have fewer
race-based programs than Texas.
"We're moving much more cautiously," said
William Jenkins, Louisiana State University
provost. "... Until directed otherwise, we are going
to leave everything in place as it is."
All three states fall under the jurisdiction of the
5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which in March
forbid universities from considering race when
admitting students. The ruling was in a reverse
discrimination lawsuit filed by four white students
denied admission to the University of Texas School
of Law in 1992. It thrust Texas into chaos at a time
when fall enrollment decisions were being made. UT
and other Texas schools temporarily suspended
race-based admissions and financial aid awards.
Mississippi and Louisiana, however, adopted a
"wait and see" posture.
CASE'S IMPACT ON LOUISIANA
When the Supreme Court issued its surprise
decision July 1 not to hear Hopwood, Morales
advised that the ruling covered financial aid as well
as admissions. Officials in the other two states, as
well as some groups in Texas, aren't so sure.
LSU and other Louisiana institutions are
following a 1994 settlement in a desegregation case
that requires fellowships for minority graduate
students and pours more money into facility
improvements at predominantly black schools. The
settlement was worked out by a 5th Circuit judge.
"We're under the 5th Circuit decree to do what we're
doing. That's our problem," Jenkins said. Hopwood
is "a Catch-22 for us."
Lawyers are still studying the ruling, and no
decisions have been made, LSU Chancellor William
E. Davis said If changes are required, it "could have
serious implications for affirmative action programs
in higher education," he said.
Eamon Kelly, president of Tulane University in
New Orleans, a private institution, said the
Hopwood decision could put schools in the three
states at a competitive disadvantage for attracting
minorities. Tulane takes race into account in some
admissions decisions but is waiting for lawyers to
complete a review before changing anything, Kelly
said. As far as minority financial aid awards go, "I'm
not sure we have any," but "I don't believe Hopwood
covers scholarships or fellowships," he said. Kelly
added, however, that the same legal reasoning would
likely apply to financial aid, thus opening the door
to future lawsuits.
CASE'S IMPACT ON MISSISSIPPI
In Mississippi, the Hopwood decision appears
to be having the least impact --for now. "It would
have had more impact had Mississippi not already
been through a major case involving admissions
standards at all the public universities," said
Mississippi State University President Donald
Zacharias. The school is reviewing its scholarships
but has reached no conclusions. "I don't anticipate
that there will be any significant impact on us,"
Zacharias said.
Based on a 1995 ruling, now under appeal, each
of Mississippi's eight public universities must have
the same admissions standards in place this fall.
Improvements also must be made at the three
historically black institutions to wipe out vestiges of
segregation. Officials at the black schools have
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expressed concerns that, because they must raise
standards to the same level as the white schools,
their enrollments will drop. Some adjustments might
be necessary, they said.
In addition, professional schools, such as
medicine and law, are reviewing programs designed
to attract minorities, officials said. "We're going to
examine it on a case-by-case basis," said Lloyd
Arnold, a special assistant attorney general assigned
to the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of
Higher Learning.
CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR UT
Asked if Texas was too quick to advise against
minority scholarships and fellowships, as some
Texas civil rights groups have argued, UT System
Vice Chancellor and General Counsel Ray Farabee
said no. Two other suits filed since Hopwood
challenge minority financial aid programs. "It would
be very difficult for a lawyer to counsel his clients in
any way other than to avoid using race as a basis in
making fellowship and other financial aid awards,"
he said.
At the same time, it might be possible for
private groups and individuals to make scholarship
awards to minorities -- so long as UT is not
involved. That issue is under review, Farabee said.
"We also are honoring multi-year scholarships and
fellowships" previously pledged to minority
students, he added.
Austin American-Statesman Copyright 1996
215
HIGH COURT PUTS UT AT A DISADVANTAGE
Public Forum - What They're Saying...
About the Supreme Court and Hopwood vs. UT Law School
Austin American-Statesman
Wednesday, July 3, 1996
Sanford Levinson
Every competent lawyer knows that a decision
of the Supreme Court not to review a case is not a
decision on the merits. Thus it is simply wrong to
say that the court, in deciding not to hear the
Hopwood case, had "upheld" the 5th Circuit Court's
decision.
All one can confidently say is that the justices
decided that the case did not present the best vehicle
for deciding what the national law should be
regarding affirmative action in higher education.
Thus Hopwood has no legal effect at all outside the
boundaries of the 5th Circuit (Texas, Louisiana and
Mississippi). One can argue that its effect is limited
to the University of Texas law school, given that no
other school was part of the litigation.
The panicked responses of university authorities
following the original decision in April and again
Monday, after announcement of the Supreme
Court's nondecision, demonstrate that competent
lawyers view Hopwood as requiring drastic changes
in the admissions process of the university. These
could go so far as to include, perhaps, a complete
blindness to the racial or ethnic status of applicants
- except for the possibly nonexistent circumstances
in which the University itself had discriminated
against members of the group in question.
But educational institutions in the 47 states
outside the 5th Circuit can also rely on an opinion
by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and David Souter
stating that the court's decision was based only on
the fact that the 1992 admissions process under
which Cheryl Hopwood was denied admission was
no longer being defended by the university. There
was, therefore, no longer any live controversy before
the court. Surely they realized that their brief
opinion would encourage most educational
institutions to continue their own race-sensitive
admissions programs, whatever onsome uniform
national rule.
As a practical matter, university will be under
an extreme disadvantage -at least until the Supreme
Court decides what it wishes to say - in competing
for talented members of minority groups who might,
nonetheless, be unable to gain admission in a
completely "race-" or "ethnicity-blind" process. To
the extent that Hopwood will be construed as
applying to faculty hiring as well, then the
disadvantages to the university will be even greater.
Whatever else one might say about affirmative
action in general, no rational person can believe it
makes sense that UT is forced to play under one set
of rules while peer universities in Virginia,
Michigan, North Carolina and elsewhere are free to
play under different rules. Yet this is one of the most
dramatic consequence of the Supreme Court's
inaction.
Will the adoption of "race-neutral" admissions
or hiring procedures change the actual composition
of the student body or faculty? Who could really
believe that the answer is no? No one has plausibly
argued that abolishing affirmative action would in
fact have no consequences. Indeed, this is one of the
few things that both supporters and opponents of
affirmative action agree on.
Perhaps some believe that affirmative action is
so bad, as a matter of social justice, that it is worth
paying the cost of UT having a substantially
all-white law school, the most likely result of
adherence to the 5th Circuit's commands.
I disagree, but at least the argument is squarely
joined. To deny, however, that Hopwood is a blow
to the hopes of many (though surely not all) African
Americans or Mexican Americans to attend or teach
at the university and, just as important, that it is a
potentially devastating blow to UT's attempts to
achieve the genuine goods produced by diversity
within its student body and faculty is to raise
questions about one's capacity to tell elemental
truths.
(Levinson holds the W. St. John Garwood and
W. St John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law at
the University of Texas School of Law.)
Austin American-Statesman Copyright 1996
216
DUCKING ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The New York Times
Wednesday, July 3, 1996
In a hurtful blow to affirmative action in higher
education, the Supreme Court said on Monday that
it would not hear an appeal by the state of Texas
from a lower court ruling that barred public
universities from using race as a factor in selecting
students. With this sidestepping, the Court left
officials in at least three Southern states who are
working to open educational opportunities for
minorities in an untenable state of uncertainty. It
also sowed confusion nationwide -- hardly an
uplifting way for the Court to finish its term and
head into recess. The Court should instead have
seized the opportunity to reject the lower court's
flawed pronouncement and reaffirmed its historic
commitment to carefully designed affirmative
action.
The high court seemed insensitive to the long
history of racism at the University of Texas Law
School, whose affirmative action program was
challenged by rejected white applicants, giving rise
to the case. As late as 1971, the law school admitted
no black students. The Court also ignored the
Clinton Justice Department, which filed a brief
warning that the "practical effect" of the lower
court's holding "will be to return the most
prestigious institutions within state university
systems to their former 'white' status."
The refusal to hear the case left standing a
ruling by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit that caused justifiable consternation in
the academic world three months ago. An appellate
panel invalidated a special admissions program at
the Texas law school aimed at increasing the
number of black and Mexican-American students.
In doing so, the panel took the gratuitous, additional
step of declaring the Supreme Court's landmark
1978 affirmative action decision in the so-called
Bakke case no longer good law. That case, involving
a suit by a rejected white applicant who sought entry
to a California state medical school, resulted in a
ruling that barred the use of quotas in affirmative
action plans but permitted universities to use race as
a factor in choosing among applicants to serve the
"compelling interest" of creating a diverse student
body.
If Bakke is no longer good law, it is for the
Supreme Court to declare. But instead of grabbing
the case to reassert Bakke's sound principle, the
justices found a way out in the odd posture of the
case. In an unusual one-paragraph opinion that was
also signed by Justice David Souter, Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg said that the Court was denying
review because the case did not actually present a
live controversy. The kind of two-track admissions
system that inspired the legal challenge is no longer
used or defended by Texas, she explained. Like
most other colleges and universities, the University
of Texas Law School now uses a single applicant
pool, in which race is one factor to be considered
among others in choosing among the qualified.
Justice Ginsburg's message, a welcome one, was
that the Court's refusal to hear the case should not
be read as an endorsement of the Fifth Circuit's
analysis. But, in fact, there was a remaining live
controversy before the Court in the Fifth Circuit's
direction to a state's leading law school to
completely exclude race as a factor in future
admissions. The shame is the Court declined to
address it.
Instead, the Court left behind a mess. Its refusal
to hear the case has put educational institutions in
the three states that make up the Fifth Circuit --
Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi -- in a terrible
spot. They could face punitive damages if they fail
to change their practices to conform to an
ill-considered ruling that may ultimately be judged
an incorrect statement of the law.
Nervous educators elsewhere in the nation can
find some comfort at least in Justice Ginsburg's
benign explanation. Eventually, this equal rights
battle will find its way back to the Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, it is premature to give up on affirmative
action programs still needed to blot out historic
racial bias and promote educational diversity.
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JUSTICES DECLINE TO HEAR CAMPUS DIVERSITY CASE
Ruling Against Race-Based Admissions Stands
The Washington Post
Tuesday, July 2, 1996
Joan Biskupic
The Supreme Court yesterday let stand a lower
court ruling that public universities may not in most
circumstances consider a student's race as a factor in
admissions decisions. By refusing to hear the
high-profile case, the justices passed up an
opportunity to resolve the uncertainty and turmoil
surrounding affirmative action on the nation's
campuses.
With no recorded dissent, the justices turned
down the University of Texas's appeal of a decision
rejecting a law school affirmative action plan
intended to build up enrollment of blacks and
Mexican Americans.
Texas officials and the Clinton administration
had urged the court to use the case to rule that
public officials have a compelling interest in making
sure state-run universities have a diverse student
body. But yesterday's action produces no new clarity
for affirmative action policies nationwide, and
instead, college administrators said, it confounds the
legal landscape.
The order casts doubt on all affirmative action
programs in Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi -- the
three states covered by the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, which last March said universities could
not justify affirmative action policies based on the
benefits of racial diversity. The appeals court said
the Texas law school's policy of giving preference to
minority applicants violated the Constitution's equal
protection guarantee.
Two justices yesterday suggested that the
court's refusal to review that ruling was based on
procedural grounds and should not be interpreted as
a sign of how the high court eventually would rule
on whether it is constitutional for colleges
nationwide to use race in deciding whom to admit.
"Whether it is constitutional for a public college
or graduate school to use race or national origin as
a factor in its admissions process is an issue of great
national importance," Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
wrote in a statement signed by Justice David H.
Souter.". . . [W]e must await a final judgment on a
program genuinely in controversy before addressing
the important question raised in this petition."
Ginsburg observed that the 1992 admissions
policy challenged by a group of rejected white
students had since been replaced. None of the other
justices issued a public comment suggesting their
reasons for refusing to review the case of Texas v.
Hopwood.
While the high court in recent years has struck
down race-based policies in government contracting
and congressional voting districts, it has yet to
revisit a landmark 1978 case standing for the
proposition that universities have a compelling
interest in educational diversity that justifies race
preferences in admissions.
College administrators contacted yesterday said
they believe they are still bound by the high court's
1978 decision, Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, endorsing racial diversity.
David Merkowitz, a spokesman for the
American Council on Education, the nation's largest
coalition of colleges and universities, said
yesterday's action "creates another level of
uncertainty" for colleges torn over affirmative
action. "We would hope that universities take this
for what it is -- a non-decision," Merkowitz said.
"We're telling them to stay the course."
Yesterday's action marked the second time in
two years that the justices had refused to review a
lower court rejection of a college affirmative action
policy. Last term, the justices let stand a 4th U.S.
Court of Appeals ruling dismantling a University of
Maryland scholarship program exclusively for
blacks.
In the Texas case, the 5th Circuit said the high
court's 1978 ruling allowing affirmative action
based on the goal of racial diversity had been
superseded by more recent high court decisions
against race-based policies in other areas. The
appeals court said an affirmative action plan would
meet court standards only if it was narrowly drawn
to remedy the present effects of past discrimination
at a particular institution. That is a tough standard to
meet.
"To believe that a person's race controls his
point of view is to stereotype him" the 5th Circuit
panel said, concluding, "the law school may not use
race as a factor in law school admissions."
Yesterday the Supreme Court neither endorsed
nor rejected that view. Ginsburg intimated that the
5th Circuit's statement that diversity never can
justify using race in admissions was not squarely
before the court and that the appeals court decision
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officially reflected only a judgment against a
now-defunct policy.
Texas officials "challenge the rationale relied on
by the Court of Appeals," Ginsburg said. "This
court, however, reviews judgments, not opinions."
She said the judgment of the lower court was that
the particular admissions procedures used in 1992
-- evaluating white and minority applicants on two
separate tracks and setting lower test score
standards for minority applicants - were
unconstitutional.
The law school has since replaced that program
with a policy that considers race with several
personal factors unique to a student. That policy has
never been subject to challenge.
Theodore B. Olson, who represented Cheryl J.
Hopwood and other white students who challenged
the Texas policy, asserted yesterday that public
colleges in Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi must
abide by the appeals court ruling.
He said he considered the statement by
Ginsburg, who has voted in the past for race-based
remedies, "an effort to put a good face on things."
"What the 5th Circuit said is clear: If the law
school continues to operate a disguised or overt
program based on race, [school officials] will be
subject to damages" to compensate students who
were improperly turned down, Olson said.
Officials at Louisiana State University said the
high court's order eventually could undercut
affirmative action. But Raymond Lamonica, vice
chancellor and professor at LSU law school, said
yesterday the school would continue to use a policy
of admitting some African American students with
below-standard test scores, under the terms of a
lower court order in a race-discrimination lawsuit
against Louisiana's higher education system.
Texas Attorney General Dan Morales said in a
statement that UT's law school would continue its
new program that makes race one of many
considerations in the application process. "Cultural,
ethnic and racial diversity in an academic or any
other environment benefits all," Morales said. "Our
universities should strive for such diversity.
However, as I have consistently indicated, it is
simply wrong to give one applicant an automatic
advantage over another applicant, based solely upon
the color of one's skin."
(Staff writer Rene Sanchez contributed to this
report.)
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